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The Brain – is wider than the Sky - 
For – put them side by side -  
The one the other will contain 
With ease – and You beside -  
 
The Brain is deeper than the sea -  
For – hold them Blue to Blue -  
The one the other will absorb -  
As Sponges – Buckets – do -  
 
The Brain is just the weight of God -  
For – Heft them – Pound for Pound -  
And they will differ – if they do - 
As Syllable from Sound -  
 
 
Emily Dickinson, 1862 
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1. General Introduction 
 
Our environment is constantly changing, thus behavioural flexibility is highly important in 
our daily lives. This flexibility requires continuous performance monitoring and decision 
making. Thus, monitoring of our own performance in everyday life is essential in order to 
adjust behavioural tendencies if necessary. External feedback, e. g. the observed behaviour 
of fellow human beings, traffic lights, noise, etc. influences our decisions. The ability to 
differentiate between favourable and unfavourable events or decision outcomes is a 
prerequisite to learn from these external cues to guide our behaviour.  
Research on decision making and feedback processing has been of interest for several 
years now. The present thesis focuses on external feedback processing investigated with 
electrophysiological measures.  
Event-related potentials (ERPs) were chosen to investigate feedback processing in healthy 
volunteers. ERPs can be considered as neuronal responses to specific internal and external 
stimuli and have been proven valuable to illustrate the strong relationship between electric 
brain activity and overt human behaviour (Andreassi, 2007). 
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2. Event-Related Potentials and Feedback Processing 
 
2.1 Error-Related Negativity (ERN) and Feedback-Related Negativity 
(FRN)  
 
2.1.1 Description of the two Components 
In cognitive neuroscience research related to decision making and performance monitoring 
mainly focused on the investigation of negative consequences. To recap the paragraph on 
electrophysiology, event-related potentials (ERPs) of the on-going electroencephalogram 
(EEG) are a suitable neuroscientific approach to investigate unfavourable events and their 
consequences. The following section describes two ERP components which are assumed to 
be highly related to each other since both are reflecting different aspects of error 
processing, i.e. mechanisms of performance monitoring. 
Internal error processing is thought to be reflected by the ERP-component called ‘Error-
Related Negativity (ERN; Gehring et al., 1993) or Error Negativity (Ne; Falkenstein et al., 
1991)’. Typically, the ERN is elicited by errors peaking about 80-100 ms after error 
commission in simple reaction time tasks, thus reflecting subjective judgements of 
response accuracy (Scheffers & Coles, 2000). The negative deflection reaches maximum 
amplitudes over fronto-central electrode sites (Gehring et al., 1993). The size of the ERN 
amplitude depends on contextual factors. For example, studies emphasizing speed over 
accuracy in reaction time tasks, thus devaluating the subjective significance of errors, have 
shown a decrease in ERN amplitude (Falkenstein et al., 1995; Gehring et al., 1993). 
Furthermore, the ERN is reduced after erroneous responses to stimuli which occur rather 
infrequently (Holroyd & Coles, 2002).  
External error processing, i.e. the processing of external feedback, is associated with 
another ERP component. Miltner and colleagues (1997) observed a negative ERP 
deflection about 200-350 ms after the presentation of external negative feedback cues at 
fronto-central electrode sites. These cues indicated an incorrect response in their time 
estimation paradigm, where subjects had to estimate the duration of one second after the 
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visual presentation of an imperative cue. Since subjects had no internal representation as to 
whether they performed the estimation well or not, they had to rely on the external 
feedback to know whether they had to improve their performance or to maintain their 
response pattern. Miltner et al. (1997) labelled this ERP component Feedback-Related 
Negativity (FRN). The authors reported that an FRN could be evoked by negative feedback 
comprising of visual, acoustic, or somato-sensory feedback, thus they assumed that the 
FRN was independent of the physical appearance of the negative feedback. In 2002, 
Gehring and Willoughby presented a study where subjects were involved in a gambling 
task where they gained or lost real money. The stimuli comprising the visual information 
about a monetary loss also evoked a negative-going ERP component with a latency and 
scalp distribution comparable to the FRN. Gehring and Willoughby (2002) named this 
component, which was sensitive to loss feedback, Medial Frontal Negativity (MFN). Most 
researchers are in accordance now that the FRN and the MFN are neuronal signs of the 
same underlying mechanism related to external feedback processing. That’s because 
Nieuwenhuis and colleagues (2004) were able to show that a fronto-central negative ERP 
deflection in the latency range of 200-350 ms could be elicited by either monetary or 
performance feedback. The authors provided subjects with an experimental paradigm 
where feedback simultaneously contained information about monetary or performance 
feedback. An FRN component was elicited by either one, only depending on which 
dimension was emphasized during the task. Thus, the FRN is thought to reflect an early 
outcome evaluation either based on a binary classification of good vs. bad (Hajcak et al., 
2006), or whether a goal has been achieved or not (Holroyd et al., 2006).  
 
Since there is no general agreement to call the response-locked ERP component ERN and 
the feedback-locked component FRN or MFN, the terms ERN, FRN, MFN are used 
synonymous in the whole manuscript. 
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Figure 1.  
Graphic adapted from Nieuwenhius and colleagues (2004). Typical amplitude courses after 
negative and positive feedback presentation at frontal electrode sites, the FRN component is 
observable between 200 and 300 ms after feedback onset, as depicted by the arrow and the text 
line. 
 
2.1.2 Neuronal Generator of the ERN and FRN 
Both ERN and FRN are assumed to be generated in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) – 
in particular in its caudal/dorsal portions - and in adjacent frontal regions, as reported by 
source localization methods (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Herrmann et al., 2004; 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997) as well as functional brain imaging studies 
(Holroyd et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2003). However, some studies failed to 
demonstrate ACC activation at all (Van Veen et al., 2004), or reported enhanced rostral 
ACC activation after positive feedback (Niewenhuis, Slagter et al., 2005). 
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Figure 2.  
Adapted from Gehring and Willoughby (2002); ERP waveforms at electrode location Fz, scalp 
topography, and probable neural generator of the FRN/MFN. (A) The red line indicates the grand-
mean waveform for all trials where participants lost money; the green line indicates the grand-mean 
waveform for all trials where participants won money. The FRN/MFN component is indicated by 
an arrow. (B) Scalp topography computed at 265 ms after feedback onset, depicting voltage values 
derived from subtracting the loss-waveform from the gain-waveform. The color red indicates a 
greater FRN/MFN effect. The red sphere indicates the best-fitting dipole model of the FRN/MFN 
component which is centred in the ACC. 
 
The ACC (BA1 24, BA 32) is a cortex region located on the medial surface of the frontal 
lobes. It is of importance for the integration of cognitive, affective, and visceral 
information (Allman et al., 2001; Critchley, 2005; Thayer & Lane, 2000).  
The nomenclature of ACC sub-divisions has been refined recently. Vogt (2005) subsumes 
recent structural and functional observations under a four-region neurobiological model of 
cingulate cortex. Firstly, the term ACC refers to the most anterior parts of the cingulate 
cortex; the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sACC) and the pregenual anterior cingulate 
cortex (pACC) respectively. The ACC is reported to be involved in autonomic control and 
emotion processing via extensive connections to different nuclei of the amygdale (Vogt, 
2009). Secondly, medial parts of the cingulate cortex are labelled MCC. The MCC is 
divided into anterior medial cingulate cortex (aMCC) and posterior medial cingulate cortex 
                                            
1
  BA: short for Brodmann Area.  
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(pMCC). In general, the MCC is reported to be involved in response selection. It 
incorporates two separate motor areas which project to the spinal cord and to motor 
cortices. Furthermore, the MCC is involved in coding the reward value of behavioral 
outcomes. Anterior parts of the MCC share connections with the amygdale, posterior parts 
project to posterior parietal cortices. Thirdly, posterior parts of the cingulate cortex are 
labelled PCC. The PCC is involved in visuospatial orientation (dorsal posterior cingulate 
cortex – dPCC) and the assessment of self-relevance (ventral posterior cingulate cortex – 
vPCC) via parietal lobe connections. Fourthly, the retrosplenial cortex (RSC) is associated 
with memory formation and memory access. 
Prior to the four-region model of cingulate cortex (Vogt, 2005), Bush and colleagues 
(2000) reported a dichotomy of affective and cognitive sub-divisions of the cingulate 
cortex. Dorsal parts were assumed to be involved in cognitive processes such as the 
assessment of motivational significance of external stimuli, action monitoring (Devinsky et 
al., 1995), and error processing (Carter et al., 1998). Rostral-ventral parts were assumed to 
be involved in affective processing (Bush et al., 2000). This dichotomy of cognitive and 
affective sub-regions of cingulate cortex can also be found in Vogt’s four-region model for 
the cyto-architectural border between ACC and MCC. 
Therefore, future studies investigating the neuronal generators of ERN and FRN should 
refer to the term MCC instead of the term ACC. 
 
2.1.3 Theoretical Background of the ERN and FRN 
 
There are several theoretical frameworks trying to give a reasonable account of both the 
ERN and the FRN.  
 
Error Monitoring System 
At first, ERN and FRN were simply interpreted in terms of operations of an error-
processing system (Gehring et al., 1993; Miltner et al., 1997). Gehring (1992) suggested 
the ERN to be sensitive to the degree of an error. Miltner and colleagues (1997) were the 
first to propose that the ERN and the FRN were functionally similar processes. They 
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interpreted these two components as indicators of a generic error detection system. This 
system should be involved in the comparison of an actual response and knowledge about 
an intended one.  If the system detects a mismatch between these two, an ERN or FRN is 
elicited (Coles et al., 2001; Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993; Scheffers & 
Coles, 2000). Furthermore, the ERN was thought to index the need for error correction or 
error compensation as proposed by Gehring and colleagues (1993). However, this 
assumption was adjusted by Scheffers and co-workers (1996). These authors found that an 
ERN is observable even in cases without the possibility of response correction, thus 
disproving a mere error correction function of the ERN. 
 
Conflict Monitoring Theory 
Building on the aforementioned theories, Botvinick and colleagues (2001) related ERN and 
FRN activity to the aspect of conflict monitoring. The authors postulated that the ACC is 
the instance that monitors decision processes and response outcomes. In cases the ACC 
detects conflict, e. g. conflicting response tendencies, ACC activity is reflected by these 
electrophysiological conflict signals, i.e. the ERN or FRN. Based on such ACC activities 
behavioural errors could be easily detected and hence avoided, since the ACC is conveying 
this information to brain regions directly responsible for the control of cognitive 
processing, e. g. to the lateral prefrontal cortex (Botvinick et al., 2001; Carter et al., 1998). 
Botvinick and co-workers (2001) described the variable ERN or FRN size in a way that it 
might reflect the magnitude of the perceived response conflict. Thus, a rather marginal 
response conflict should be reflected in rather small ERN and FRN amplitudes, whereas a 
large response conflict should be reflected in larger ERN and FRN amplitudes. To be more 
specific, response conflicts may be exemplified by means of situations where multiple 
responses compete for the control of action (Yeung et al., 2004). Yeung and colleagues 
(2004) reported three possible situations where an ERN could be observed. The component 
is evoked either after an overt response error in choice reaction-time tasks, or after external 
feedback about response accuracy, or after late responses in choice reaction-time tasks 
when speed is emphasized over accuracy (Johnson et al., 1997). Furthermore, the converse 
argument is applicable because the presence of enhanced response conflict causes higher 
probability of error commission since more attention resources are necessary for solving 
the conflicting situation.  
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The conflict monitoring account of the ERN further suggests that a negative deflection 
should by observable after a correct response when the experimental trial contained highly 
conflicting elements. Based on this suggestion, Botvinick and colleagues (2001) developed 
a connectionist model for conflict monitoring. This model suggested a main distinction 
between error and correct trails. Error trials might be characterized by response conflicts in 
the period after the response, whereas correct trails might be characterized by response 
conflicts which occur mostly prior to the response. Therefore, Botvinick and co-workers 
(2001) argued that the N2 component (a negative deflection of the ERP about 200 ms after 
stimulus presentation) is the possible physiological correlate of the cognitive conflict prior 
to a correct response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 
Model of conflict monitoring (adapted from Holroyd and Yeung, 2003). The red box indicates 
mechanisms that monitor performance; the green boxes indicate mechanisms that map external 
input into response outputs. The yellow box indicates a separate mechanism for cognitive control. 
Abbreviations: ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; MC, motor cortex; PC, posterior cortex; PFC, 
prefrontal cortex. 
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Reinforcement Learning Theory 
Another influencing theoretical account for ERN and FRN generation is the reinforcement 
learning theory of the ERN (RL-theory) proposed by Holroyd and Coles (2002). The 
authors suggested a response-monitoring system within the basal ganglia producing a 
specific error signal (reflected by the ERN or FRN) whenever detecting that the outcome 
of an event is worse than expected. This error signal would be conveyed to different 
cortical regions, amongst them the ACC, via a phasic decrease in tonic 
mesencephalic/dopaminergic activity. Thus, ERN and FRN appear to reflect the activation 
of this reinforcement learning system, which rapidly evaluates decision outcomes to guide 
reward seeking behaviour (Holroyd & Coles, 2002).  Nieuwenhuis and colleagues (2004) 
elaborated the theoretical framework of the RL-theory. Firstly, they proposed that the 
ERN/FRN indicates the evaluation of decision outcomes along an abstract dimension 
‘good versus bad’ (c. f. Hajcak et al., 2006). Secondly, they stated that the amplitude of the 
ERN/FRN depends on the relation of the expected versus the actual outcome. Thirdly, 
Nieuwenhuis and co-workers (2004) summarized that the FRN amplitude varies inversely 
to the ERN amplitude (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). This has been observed in gambling 
paradigms, where subjects used external feedback to learn specific cue-response 
contingencies. In these cases, the negative ERP deflection virtually 'propagated back' in 
time, namely from the negative feedback stimuli at the begin of learning, to the motor 
response, when individuals had learnt the contingency but made nevertheless an error. And 
finally, they agree with the notion that the ERN/FRN is generated in the ACC. 
Furthermore, Holroyd and Coles (2002) suggested that the ERN/FRN could be seen as a 
sign for a reward prediction error indicating the difference between a reward received and 
a predicted one. To be more specific, this so-called reward prediction error may also 
incorporate information about the next prediction mode by the reward system (Bertsekas & 
Tsitsiklis, 1996). To convey these theoretical assumptions in a physiological framework, 
the work of Schultz (1998) and Montague and colleagues (2004) was used. Holroyd and 
colleagues (2003) summarized that the RL-theory account of a negative reward prediction 
error signal (i.e., worse than expected; which is thought to induce a disinhibition of the 
ACC, thus leading to a negative deflection in the ongoing EEG) is caused by a phasic 
decrease of mesencephalic dopamine activity. These thoughts led to a major prediction of 
the RL-theory: the FRN amplitude should be positively related the size of the prediction 
error (i.e., numerically larger FRN amplitudes can be expected after highly unexpected 
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events), thus implying that the relation between the expected and the actual outcome is the 
most important variable influencing the actual ERP amplitude (Hajcak, Holroyd et al., 
2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 
Model of RL-theory (adapted from Holroyd and Yeung, 2003). The red box indicates mechanisms 
that monitor performance; the green box indicates mechanisms that map external input into 
response output. Abbreviations: ACC, anterior cingulate cortex, BG, basal ganglia; DA, 
mesencephalic dopamine system. 
 
The mathematical base of RL-theory is the so-called temporal difference learning (TD 
learning) account. TD learning is a prediction method mostly used for solving 
reinforcement learning problems. It combines a Monte Carlo method, i.e. the model learns 
by sampling according to a specific strategy, with bootstrapping methods, which means 
that current estimates are based on approximations of previously acquired estimates 
(Sutton & Barto, 1998). Schultz and colleagues (1997) reported that the firing rate of 
dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the substantia nigra (i.e., 
parts of the mesencephalic dopamine system) seems to imitate the TD learning algorithm 
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in monkeys, thus relating the TD learning account to neuroscience. Following this notion, 
Schultz (1998) trained a monkey to associate a specific cue with a rewarding stimulus. 
When the monkey was initially confronted with the rewarding stimulus its dopamine cells 
of the aforementioned areas increased their firing rates, thus indicating differences between 
the expected and the actual reward. After several repeated presentations the increase in 
firing rate was related to the specific cue indicating the reward. Finally, when the monkey 
had completely learned the cue-response contingency, no increase in firing rate for the 
presentation of the rewarding stimuli was observable any more. 
It should be emphasised that the function of the TD learning account is not simply 
reflecting the difference between a received reward and a predicted one, as the 
Rescorla/Wagner model2 does (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), which renders the TD learning 
account so useful. Instead, information about the next prediction is incorporated in the 
error signals (Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996), which is stated more precisely in the following 
simplified formula by Montague and colleagues (2004; reward prediction error 
hypothesis): 
 
Current TD error = current reward + δ * next prediction – current prediction  
δ reflects a coefficient between 0 and 1 weighting the relative influence of the next 
prediction 
 
Some evidence supporting the RL-theory is also revealed by neuropsychology. Prefrontal 
and basal ganglia lesions disrupt the emergence of an ERN, thus suggesting that the fronto-
striato-thalamo-cortical loops proposed by Holroyd and Coles (2002) are necessary pre-
requisites to generate this ERP component (Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2006). 
 
Theories regarding the Violation of Expectations 
Recently, Oliveira and colleagues (2007) postulated an expectancy deviation hypothesis to 
                                            
2
 The Rescorla/Wagner model (1972) is an account for Pavlovian conditioning. The model predicts that 
differences between expected and unexpected outcomes are evident only during the first observations.  
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explain neuronal processes involved in decision making. The authors suggested in their 
theoretical account that it is not the unfavourable feedback per se which evokes the 
mentioned error ERP components. In their opinion, it is the violation of previously built-up 
expectations that could be detected by the ACC which is responsible for the error-related 
ERPs. Furthermore, they explain larger ERN/FRN amplitudes after an error or negative 
feedback by an overoptimistic bias which strongly influences our performance estimates 
and resulting expectations (Miller & Ross, 1975). Comparable conclusions were drawn by 
Wu and Zhou (2009) in their study investigating prediction errors. According to the 
authors the FRN might reflect a reward prediction error which is not only defined in terms 
of valence. They suggested that the FRN indicates also information about whether or not a 
pre-established expectancy about an event is full-filled, irrespective whether 
experimentally introduced block-wise or trial-wise. 
In line with the RL-theory Yasuda and co-workers (2004) reported the FRN responds more 
to negative reward prediction error signals (i.e., the events that were worse than expected) 
than to the error feedback per se. They speculated that the FRN might merely indicate a 
neuronal signal modifying the behavioural response strategy or that the FRN enhancement 
after unexpected negative outcomes might be due to this surprising outcome. However, 
Hajcak, Holroyd et al. (2005) reported the FRN being equally large for expected and 
unexpected feedback. Holroyd et al. (2006) extended the RL-theory and claimed that the 
FRN is indicating whether a goal has been achieved or not.  
 
ERN and FRN indicating motivationally salient Events 
Following the evolution of theoretical concepts of the ERN/FRN, interpretations changed 
over the time. 
Gehring and Willoughby (2002) and Luu and colleagues (2003) came to the agreement that 
the FRN is either reflecting the affective significance or the emotional valence of the 
eliciting stimuli. Surprisingly, Yeung and colleagues (2005) and Donkers and colleagues 
(2005) observed an FRN component even in paradigms where no overt motor response 
was required. According to their finding they state that the ERN/FRN is sensitive to task 
demands. For example, the ERN amplitude is correlated with subjective judgements of 
response accuracy (Scheffers & Coles, 2000). Furthermore, the ERN amplitude is 
enhanced when response accuracy is emphasized over speed (Falkenstein et al., 1995; 
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Gehring et al., 1993). And the ERN amplitude is reduced with incorrect responses to 
infrequent stimuli, e. g. in conditions in which errors are particularly likely (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002). Following Yeung and colleagues (2005) notion, the FRN is also numerically 
larger with overt responses required than without any responses. 
 
2. 1. 4. Correct Response Negativity (CRN) 
There is another controversy regarding ERP components and feedback processing. Are 
there specific ERP components following correct reactions or positive feedback? Vidal and 
colleagues (2000, 2003) reported a small response-locked negative-going ERP component 
on correct trials. The authors labelled this component ‘Correct Response Negativity 
(CRN)’. They also assumed that the CRN shares morphological and topographical 
properties with the ERN, which would imply that both components might index response 
monitoring processes. In line with this assumption, Ridderinkhof and colleagues (2004) 
hypothesized that CRN amplitude might be related to response control performance 
measures. And indeed they observed increased accuracy and reduced reaction time 
interference from incompatible stimuli in trials following those with large CRN 
amplitudes. Thus, it might well be that ERN and CRN are comparable medio-frontal 
negativities related to evaluation during response monitoring. Coles and colleagues (2001) 
related an observed CRN in correct trails either to the possibility that error-processing is 
also present with correct responses, or to methodological issues deriving from the 
response-locked average.  
Later on, Hajcak, Moser and colleagues (2005) suggested that there possibly is a functional 
difference between ERN and CRN, since their data showed no increase in CRN amplitude 
during more significant correct trials, but an increase in ERN amplitude during more 
significant error trials. Applying a gambling paradigm, Hajcak and co-workers (2006) 
observed small negative ERP deflections after feedback indicating a reward (i.e., a correct 
response choice). This observation found was supported by another study by Hajcak and 
colleagues (2007), where once again small FRNs were found after rewarding feedback.  
At the same time, also a positive ERP component in the ERN/FRN latency range after 
positive feedback has been claimed by other researchers (Holroyd et al., 2003; 2008; Potts 
et al., 2006). Potts and colleagues (2006) used a passive S1-S2 reward prediction paradigm 
where they observed positive-going components. Holroyd and colleagues (2008) calculated 
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difference waves of oddball and feedback conditions which also yielded positive ERP 
deflections. Thus, both studies have only restricted value for comparison to the remaining 
majority of ERN and FRN studies since they used rather rare experimental paradigms. 
 
 
2.2 P300 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical Background of the P300 
The P300 component is another valuable indicator of performance monitoring. In general, 
the P300 wave (also P3 or classical P3b) is described as a positive deflection of the ERP, 
peaking between 300-600 ms after stimulus onset at posterior electrode sites (Duncan-
Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Johnson & Donchin, 1980). Originally, the P300 was 
investigated with acoustic oddball paradigms. With this kind of paradigm subjects were 
required to respond to (e. g., pressing a button, raising a finger, or count) infrequent target 
tones and withhold that response with frequent target tones. The distinction of the two 
tones was possible due to different sound level or pitch. The P300 component appears to be 
dependent on various factors, such as categorical stimulus probability (Johnson & 
Donchin, 1980; Kutas et al., 1977), stimulus quality, attention (Polich & Kok, 1995), task 
relevance of the stimulus (Coles et al., 1995), or motivational significance of the presented 
stimuli (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). Furthermore, the P300 amplitude is also an index of task 
demands, task complexity and resource allocation (Israel et al., 1980). Most researchers 
consider the P300 to play an important role in recognition and memory-updating processes. 
Donchin and Coles (1988) suggested that the P300 amplitude is an indicator for context-
updating in working memory. Only recently, some researchers reported a relation of P300 
and motivational stimulus significance (Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones et al., 2005; Yeung & 
Sanfey, 2004). Varying P300 amplitudes were found in tasks requiring decisions or 
outcome evaluations (Hajcak et al., 2005; 2007; Luu et al., 2009; Sato et al., 2005; Yeung 
& Sanfey, 2004; Yeung et al., 2005). All these authors assumed that P300 amplitude 
modulation might reflect the evaluation of the functional significance of the stimulus at 
hand that passed on external feedback. Supporting this view, Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones 
and colleagues (2005) proposed that the P300 might code the motivational significance of 
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rewarding stimuli along a good versus bad dimension. This coarse categorization of 
stimulus evaluation was also attributed to the FRN (Hajcak et al., 2006).  
However, the results regarding the P300 as an indicator of stimulus valence are still 
controversial; contradicting observations were reported, that larger P300 amplitudes might 
be related to negative valence (Cohen et al., 2007; Ito et al., 1998), to positive valence 
(Bellebaum & Daum, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2007), or to be uncorrelated with stimulus 
valence, at all (Sato et al., 2005; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004).  
 
2.2.2 Neuronal Generators of the P300 
The temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) has been suggested as potential generator structure for 
the P300 (Smith et al., 1990), as well as several other areas including parietal and frontal 
sites (Ardekani et al., 2002). 
 
3. Psychopathology and Feedback Processing 
 
Psychopathology is associated with a variety of cognitive and affective deficits. Common 
phenomena in psychopathology are impairments in action monitoring. For example, they 
manifest in prolonged response inhibition time (Enticott, Ogloff & Bradshaw, 2008) and 
reduced ERN amplitudes (Alain, McNeely, He, Christensen & West, 2002) in patients 
suffering from schizophrenia, as well as enhanced ERN amplitudes in obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Gehring, Himle & Nisenson, 2000).  
A construct generally related to psychopathology is the antisocial personality disorder 
(DSM-IV [American Psychiatric Association]; but see also dissocial personality disorder 
of the IDC-10 [World Health Organization]), and the construct of psychopathy. 
 
3.1 Antisocial (Dissocial) Personality Disorder 
Although the diagnosis of an antisocial personality disorder (DSM-IV) is considered to be 
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the corresponding diagnosis to the dissocial personality disorder (ICD-10), some 
discrepancies arise when comparing the two. To start with, both diagnostic manuals share 
the following characteristics of the disorder: (i) lack of respect for social norms, 
obligations and irresponsibility, (ii) reckless, irritable, violent and aggressive behaviour, 
and (iii) lack of remorse and guilt. However, lack of empathy and the inability of 
maintaining lasting relationships is only incorporated into the ICD-10 diagnostic scheme, 
whereas the facets of repeated lying and conning others for personal benefit and pleasure, 
high levels of impulsivity, and reckless disregard for safety (both for oneself and for 
others) are only listed in the DSM-IV diagnostic scheme (Rodrigo et al., 2010).     
 
Psychological measures 
In the present PhD-thesis the personality questionnaire “Persönlichkeits-Stil und Störungs 
Inventar” (PSSI, Kuhl & Kazén, 1997) was administered to each participant prior to EEG 
data collection. The PSSI is a self-assessment tool comprising 14 scales assessing the 
relative manifestation of 14 non-clinical personality traits that cover the non-pathological 
diagnostic criteria of personality disorders of the DSM-IV as well as the ICD-10. In 
particular, the first sub-scale of the PSSI, the so-called antisociality (AS) scale was of 
interest for the present project.  Reliability of this specific sub-scale (Cronbach's α = 0.86) 
as well as its validity are reported to be satisfactory. The scale consists of ten items, 
characterizing individuals according to self-determined and inconsiderate behavior to 
achieve their individual goals. Furthermore, individuals scoring high on this sub-scale are 
described to act self-confidently, offending, and humiliating during the interaction with 
others, as well as having problems in adjusting to social and legal norms. Each item has to 
be rated in the range of four options: 'does not apply – 'applies in some ways' - ‘applies 
predominantly' – 'applies completely'. The following is an example item, “If people turn 
against me I can wear them down”. 
The AS sub-scale is not supposed to be sensitive to clinical levels of antisociality though 
(Kuhl & Kazén, 1997), thus identifying only individuals with moderate levels of antisocial 
personality characteristics, but it does not account for pathological symptoms of the 
personality disorder.  
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3.2 Psychopathy  
Psychopathy is mostly described as personality disorder, although it is not included in the 
present version of the ICD-10 or DSM-IV. However, the construct of psychopathy is 
described by various behavioural tendencies and personality characteristics which can be 
found in diagnostic manuals. A combination of superficial charm, persistent instrumental 
antisocial behaviour, marked sensation-seeking, poor ability for reflection, blunted 
empathy and shallow emotional experiences is thought to represent a prototypical 
psychopathic individual (Hare, 2003). The idea of the construct itself was raised by 
Cleckley who gave a clinical description of the construct in his book The Mask of Sanity 
(1941). Cleckley mainly described apparently good functioning persons with a covered 
disturbance. The description of these individuals included interpersonal (egocentricity, 
lovelessness, impersonal sexuality and superficial charm), and emotional (affect 
impairments, lack of nervousness and guiltlessness) characteristics, as well as disinhibited 
or antisocial behaviour (see Fowles & Dindo, 2009), thereby being a great burden for 
society and acquainted individuals. The concept has been developed further over the last 
decades.   
 
Psychological measures 
Hare provided a renewed conceptualization as well as an instrument to measure 
psychopathy (Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, PCL-R; Hare, 2003). The PCL-R is a semi-
structural interview combining information of charts and professional ratings. Contrary to 
the concept of dissocial personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder, Hare’s 
concept of psychopathy combines specific personality traits and antisocial behavioural 
tendencies (Hare & Neumann, 2008). The ICD-10 and DSM-IV, however, characterize 
these personality disorders only on the behavioural level. There are several other measures 
to capture psychopathic personality traits, such as the Psychopathic Personality Inventory 
(PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996), which is a self-description inventory to assess 
psychopathy-related characteristics in non-criminal samples though. There is also a 
German version of this inventory available (Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised, 
PPI-R; Alpers & Eisenbarth, 2008). 
Factor-analytic approaches have revealed a two-factor solution regarding the theoretical 
concept behind the PCL-R (Hare, 2003).  Factor 1 is characterized by emotional-
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interpersonal deficits indicating core features of psychopathy (e. g., superficial charm, 
manipulative behavior, lack of remorse or guilt, shallow affect, etc.) - “primary 
psychopathy”, Factor 2 is characterized by impulsive antisocial behavior (e. g., poor 
behavioral control, impulsivity, irresponsiblity, etc.) - “secondary psychopathy”. Both 
PCL-R factors correlated moderately with each other (Hare, 2003). Lilienfeld and Andrews 
(1996) administered the PPI to a large population of non-criminal individuals. Factor 
analysis of this data revealed two factors (PPI-I - “fearless dominance”, PPI-II - “impulsive 
antisociality”) parallel to those of the PCL-R, although these two were not correlated. 
Fowles and Dindo (2006) as well as Patrick (2007) have stressed theoretical implications 
of the two-factor model of psychopathy. Factor 1 might be associated with a pattern of low 
fear and anxiety, and strong reward motivation that leads to reward-seeking behavior 
lacking fear of consequences or concerns for others. In comparison, Factor 2 might be 
merely associated with impulsivity and disinhibition leading to chronic antisocial behavior 
and antagonism towards others. Furthermore, Patrick (2007) suggested a relation of Factor 
2 with externalizing psychopathology, a heritable personality dimension in young adults 
which is considered to be a risk factor for antisocial personality disorder, as well as 
substance and alcohol abuse.  
To summarize, the diagnosis of psychopathy is associated with increased scores on items 
related to both factors. 
 
3.3 Biological Origins of Psychopathy 
Recent findings suggest viewing psychopathy as a developmental disorder (Lynam et al., 
2007) with first symptoms emerging in childhood. Two current theoretical accounts stress 
either attentional or emotional dysfunctions in individuals scoring high on psychopathy 
measures. 
In 1983, Hare and Jutai first linked psychopathy to attentional abnormalities. Recently, an 
attention-based model of psychopathy was proposed by Lorenz and Newman (2002). The 
authors observed reduced response modulation in psychopaths. They interpreted this as a 
result of inadequate processing of the meaning of peripheral or incidental information, 
which is not in the attention focus of the psychopathic individual. In line with this proposal 
is an observation by Raine and Venables (1988) when administering a visual performance 
task to psychopaths and healthy controls and recording EEG. The psychopathic individuals 
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displayed larger and delayed P300 amplitudes. Thus, Raine and Venalbes (1988) assumed 
that these results might indicate that psychopaths showed enhanced ability to attend to 
stimuli of interest. This observation points towards the possibility of performance 
proficiencies of psychopaths under specific circumstances (Raine, 1989). Recently, Sadeh 
and Verona (2008) summarized that Factor 1 psychopathic traits were associated with this 
over-focussed attention on motivationally salient stimuli. Furthermore, these authors 
showed that Factor 2 psychopathic traits were associated with deficits in cognitive control 
as indexed by deficits in working memory functions (Sadeh & Verona, 2008). 
Since psychopathy is linked to emotional dysfunctions and antisocial behaviour, the second 
theoretical account – emotional dysfunctions in psychopathy – has gained growing support 
(Blair et al., 2005; Frick & Morsee, 2006; Lykken, 1995). Blair (2010) subsumes in his 
review on neuroimaging and psychopathy that a disruption of the functioning of the 
amygdala, the superior temporal cortex, as well as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been 
repeatedly associated with psychopathic tendencies (de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008; 
Tiihonen et al., 2008). Furthermore, Blair (2010) claims that these observed dysfunctions 
were specific for individuals with psychopathic traits and cannot be observed in any other 
patient group. Further studies on the biological basis of psychopathy report severe 
difficulties in aversive conditioning and instrumental learning in psychopaths (Blair, 2001; 
Patrick, 1994), and deficits to share the emotions ‘fear’ and ‘sadness’ in others (Blair, 
2001). All these considerations may be subsumed under the low-fear model of 
psychopathy (Fowles & Dindo, 2006; Patrick, 2007). 
To address the relationship between psychopathic and antisocial personality characteristics, 
about 30% of individuals suffering from antisocial personality disorder also meet the 
criteria of psychopathy (Hart & Hare, 1996). Recent results by Coid and Ullrich (2010) 
confirm the percentage of 30% comorbidity of antisocial personality disorder and 
psychopathy. Furthermore, the authors suggest a dimensional approach and postulate that 
antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy were disorders on a diagnostic continuum 
with symptom overlap. 
 
3.4 The Relation of Antisociality, Psychopathy, and Feedback Processing 
The present PhD-thesis focussed on sub-clinical manifestations of antisocial personality 
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traits. Several studies investigated error and feedback processing in psychopathy and 
related constructs, such as antisocial personality traits, impulsivity, externalizing 
psychopathology and low socialization level with psychophysiological methods. For 
example, Munro and colleagues (2007a) studied activation differences between inmates of 
a forensic institution classified as psychopaths by the PCL-R (Hare, 2003) and healthy 
controls. The authors used a classical letter flanker paradigm (a common paradigm to 
evoke the ERN)3 (neutral condition) as well as an emotional face flanker paradigm 
(affective condition). Participants had to distinguish the emotions anger and fear to judge 
whether the flanking stimuli were the same as the one in the middle or not. The authors 
found reduced ERN amplitudes only for the affectively-loaded flanker paradigm. The 
neutral stimuli led to no error-related activation differences between the two groups. 
Altogether, Munro and colleagues (2007b) hypothesized that effects of psychopathy might 
be more likely in cases where response monitoring involves either affectively-based 
stimuli (such as emotional faces), or affectively-charged situations (such as rewarding 
situations, punishment). These results are partly in line with Brazil and colleagues (2009) 
who found no group differences concerning the ERN amplitudes between inmates of a 
psychiatric institution scoring high on the PCL-R and matched controls with a comparable 
flanker task. However, Brazil and co-workers (2009) reported a reduction in the error 
positivity (Pe) amplitude as well as reduced signalling of error rates in the psychopathy 
group. The Pe is known to be a positive deflection succeeding the ERN (Gehring et al., 
1993; Falkenstein et al., 1991). The Pe peaks between 200 to 400 ms after the onset of the 
incorrect response, thus, it is assumed to reflect later stages of error processing 
(Falkenstein et al., 1991). These later stages of error processing were linked to conscious 
error awareness (Falkenstein et al., 2000). According to Brazil and colleagues (2009) 
psychopaths showed intact early error processing as indexed by unchanged ERN 
amplitudes, but later stages of error processing might be impaired as indexed by Pe 
amplitude reduction. This would imply that psychopathic individuals have difficulties to 
effectively use internal error information to change and adapt their future behaviour. von 
                                            
3
  The classical letter flanker task by Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) consists of five-letter strings where the 
two letters at each end were either congruent (SSSSS, HHHHH) to the central presented letter or 
incongruent (SSHSS, HHSHH). Participants’ task is to indicate whether the central letter is S or H by two 
different mortor responses. Since fast motor responses are required, response errors are more common in 
incongruent trials. 
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Borries and colleagues (2009) investigated error-related learning deficits in individuals 
with psychopathy. The authors reported deficits in internal error processing, but no ERP 
amplitude modifications during external error processing. Chang and colleagues (2010) 
tried to relate error monitoring in healthy individuals to those with antisocial personality 
characteristics; they observed that depressive symptoms as well as antisocial characteristics 
were valuable predictors for ERN amplitudes in a flanker task. However, antisocial 
personality traits alone were the only predictor for Pe amplitude. In contrast to Brazil and 
co-workers (2009), Chang and colleagues (2010) chose a correlative approach to 
investigate error monitoring with psychopathy and antisociality. Furthermore, Brazil's 
subjects were inpatients of a psychiatric institution, whereas Chang's subjects were college 
students. 
Regarding P300 amplitudes and antisociality and psychopathy, Gao and Raine (2009) 
reported mixed results in their review (c. f., Raine & Venalbes, 1988 vs. Bernat et al., 
2007). Furthermore, they suggested that results in antisocials may not apply to results 
obtained in psychopaths. Nevertheless, reduced P300 amplitudes and longer P300 latencies 
were repeatedly associated with antisocial behavior, thus reflecting inefficient allocation of 
neuronal resources (Gao & Raine, 2009). 
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4. Research Questions – Aim of the Project 
 
The aim of the present study was two-fold:  
 The first question focused on the processing of unexpected feedback outcomes, in 
particular on unexpected positive feedback outcomes. In line with the literature presented 
above, two ERP components are likely to occur with unexpected positive feedback. Firstly, 
an intermediate negative-going ERP deflection during the FRN time interval may occur as 
proposed by Hajcak and colleagues (2007) and, secondly, also a positive-going ERP 
deflection in the same time interval as reported by Holroyd and colleagues (2003, 2008) 
and Potts and colleagues (2006) . 
However, according to the monitoring function of the ACC proposed in the RL-theory we 
suggested that unexpectedness as well as negative valence alone would induce a reward 
prediction error signal, which could appear as a negative-going ERP deflection on the 
scalp. Therefore, we expected in line with Hajcak and co-workers (2007) unexpected 
positive feedback to elicit a distinct negative ERP deflection during the FRN time range, 
which should nevertheless be smaller than the ERP component after unexpected negative 
feedback. Regarding the P300, we were interested in effects related to probability of 
occurrence and stimulus valence. In line with Johnson and Donchin (1980), we expected 
larger P300 amplitudes with unexpected compared to expected feedback stimuli, but no 
amplitude modulation caused by stimulus valence (Sato et al., 2004; Yeung & Sanfey, 
2005). These research questions will be addressed in the first manuscript. 
 The second research question focused on the relationship of antisocial personality 
characteristics and feedback processing. We studied the impact of non-clinical antisocial 
personality characteristics on FRN and P300 amplitudes. Since antisocial personality traits 
were associated with the concept of psychopathy – which is among others characterized by 
deficits in emotional processing (Cleckley, 1976; Blair et al., 2004) – we expected 
individuals with higher values of antisociality to display smaller FRN amplitudes than 
individuals with lower values of antisociality. Furthermore, we expected smaller P300 
amplitudes in antisocial subjects (Gao & Raine, 2009). These research questions will be 
addressed in the second manuscript. 
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5. Material and Methods 
Two EEG studies were conducted at the Brain Research Laboratory of the Faculty of 
Psychology, University of Vienna. Twenty healthy volunteers participated in each study. 
The experimental gambling paradigms used are described in detail in each methods section 
of the two following manuscripts. The first EEG-study used numerical feedback stimuli 
that directly indicated real monetary gain or loss in each trial (Study Monetary Feedback). 
The data of this study are presented in Article I.  
Feedback stimuli were different in the second study. Photographs of human posers 
depicting happy and angry facial expressions were presented to indicate positive (happy) or 
negative (angry) performance feedback in each trial (Study Facial Feedback). Although 
participants of the second study also received a financial bonus after completion of the 
experiment, the facial feedback stimuli indicated monetary reward only indirectly 
compared to the first study. Data of both studies are included in Article II.  
Participants’ financial remuneration was paid by a scholarship of the University of Vienna 
awarded to DMP in 2008. (Förderstipendium StudFG). 
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6. Article I  
Manipulation of feedback expectancy and valence induces negative and 
positive reward prediction error signals manifest in event-related brain 
potentials 
 
Daniela M. Pfabigan, Johanna Alexopoulos, Herbert Bauer, Uta Sailer 
Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Liebiggasse 5, A–1010 Vienna, Austria 
Running head: FRN, P300, and Prediction Errors Signals 
Descriptors: FRN, P300, reward prediction error signals 
 
Abstract 
 
The feedback-related negativity (FRN) has been hypothesized to be most sensitive to 
unexpected negative feedback. The present study investigated feedback expectancy and 
valence using a probabilistic gambling paradigm where subjects encountered expected or 
unexpected positive and negative feedback outcomes. In line with previous studies FRN 
amplitude reflected a negative reward prediction error, but to a minor extent also a positive 
reward prediction error. Moreover, the P300 amplitude was largest after unexpected feedback, 
irrespective of valence. 
We propose to interpret the FRN in terms of a reinforcement learning signal which is detecting 
mismatch between internal and external representations indexed by the ACC to extract 
motivationally salient outcomes. 
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Introduction 
Outcome evaluation has been of research interest for several years now. In event-related 
potential (ERP) studies, two ERP components have been found to be sensitive to different 
aspects of performance outcomes. One of the ERP components sensitive to outcome evaluation 
is the feedback-related negativity (FRN), which is a negative-going deflection in the ERP 
occurring after external negative feedback (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 
1997; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004). Peaking around 250 ms over frontal 
midline electrode-sites, the FRN is thought to reflect an early outcome evaluation, based on the 
binary classification of good vs. bad (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006), or of whether 
a goal has been achieved or not (Holroyd, Hajcak, & Larsen, 2006). The medial frontal 
negativity (MFN), an ERP that is elicited after monetary losses (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2005; Hajcak et al., 2006), has comparable scalp 
distribution and latency. Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, Schurger, and Cohen (2004) showed 
that a negative ERP deflection could be elicited by either monetary or performance feedback 
when feedback contained information about both dimensions at the same time, depending on 
which dimension was emphasized during task presentation. Therefore, the terms FRN and 
MFN are interchangeable in the present study.  
The FRN was originally interpreted by Miltner et al. (1997) in terms of operations of 
an error-processing system. In contrast to that, Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen 
(2001) as well as Yeung, Botvinick, and Cohen (2004) claimed to integrate the FRN into their 
concept of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) as a monitor for response conflict. Another 
theory accounting for the FRN is the reinforcement-learning theory (RL-theory) proposed by 
Holroyd and Coles (2002). The RL-theory states that events are evaluated by a monitoring 
system within the basal ganglia, making predictions whether or not events will turn out to be 
successful. If events are worse than expected, the inhibitory impact of dopaminergic neurons in 
the prefrontal cortex on the ACC is reduced by a phasic decrease of the dopaminergic level 
(Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). This so called temporal difference error (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002) leads to a disinhibition of neurons in the ACC triggering the FRN. This negative 
prediction signal is used to optimize the acquisition of new action-outcome relations. 
Moreover, Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, et al. (2004) reported that the amplitude of the FRN was 
depending on the relation between expected and actual outcome, and that it was most negative 
after unexpected negative feedback. Indeed, the cortical generator of the FRN has been 
identified in the ACC and adjacent cortical regions (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd et 
al., 2004; Miltner et al., 1997). Whereas Holroyd and Coles (2002) interpreted the FRN purely 
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as reinforcement signal, Gehring and Willoughby (2002) stated that the FRN might reflect the 
motivational impact of ongoing events. Yeung, Holroyd, and Cohen (2005) extended the RL-
theory by adding the notion that the FRN could reflect the reward signal alone without 
requiring an overt action. Subsequently, the ACC would use this reward signal to learn 
contingencies of the external environment.  
However, predictions of the RL-theory regarding positive prediction signals are 
ambiguous. RL-theory would be consistent with the assumption that unexpected positive 
feedback (i) is associated with a small FRN (see Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007), 
but also (ii) is not associated with an FRN, but with a positive ERP deflection in the time range 
of the FRN (Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2003; Potts, Martin, Burton, & 
Montague, 2006). The present study explicitly tested the hypothesis that the amplitude of the 
FRN is sensitive to the expectedness of the feedback as well as to feedback valence. More 
precisely, we predicted (i) that negative feedback would elicit an FRN, with larger FRN 
amplitudes for unexpected negative feedback than for expected or control negative feedback, 
and (ii) that unexpected positive feedback would also induce a distinct negative ERP deflection 
in the interval of the FRN.  
 The second component sensitive to performance outcomes is the P300, a component of 
the ERP peaking around 300 – 600 ms after stimulus presentation at posterior sites, which is 
primarily sensitive to stimulus significance and probability of occurrence (Duncan-Johnson & 
Donchin, 1977; Johnson & Donchin, 1980). Recent studies found modulated P300 amplitudes 
during decision and outcome evaluation tasks (Hajcak et al., 2005; Hajcak et al., 2007; Luu, 
Shane, Pratt, & Tucker, 2009; Sato et al., 2005; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Yeung et al., 2005), 
probably reflecting the evaluation of the functional significance of the feedback stimuli. In line 
with these P300 amplitude modulations, Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, and Cohen (2005) stated 
that the P300 would also code the motivational significance of a reward along a good vs. bad 
dimension. However, the results are still controversial. Based on Yeung and Sanfey (2004) and 
Sato et al. (2005), we expected larger P300 amplitudes for less expected feedback, regardless 
of feedback valence. Furthermore, we explored the latencies of both ERP components. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
Twenty right-handed subjects – ten women, ten men – participated in this study (mean age 
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26.6 +/- 3.27 years). Handedness was assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(Oldfield, 1971). All subjects were students of the University of Vienna, had normal or 
adequately corrected vision, were free of neurological diseases, and had no psychiatric history. 
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki (1973, revised in 
1983) and local guidelines and regulations of the University of Vienna. Prior to participation, 
written informed consent was obtained from each participant. Subjects received an individual 
financial remuneration (between 10 and 25 Euros) depending on individual performance in the 
experimental task. Data from all 20 participants were subjected to statistical analysis. 
 
Task                    
Prior to the experimental session, subjects had to complete a personality questionnaire (PSSI; 
Kuhl and Kazén, 1997) and a social attribution questionnaire (FKK; Krampen, 1991), the 
results of which will not be the subject of the current article.      
The participants were comfortably seated about 70 cm in front of a 19-inch cathode ray tube 
monitor in a sound-attenuated room. Stimulus presentation and synchronization with the 
electroencephalogram (EEG) data collection was controlled by E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). The experiment started with 48 training trials, where 
subjects (i) learned specific cue-response-contingencies necessary for the forthcoming 
experiment, and (ii) made themselves familiar with the experimental task. Trial numbers and 
reward probabilities per condition are presented in Table 1.  
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TABLE 1. Reward probabilities in training and experimental sessions, classification of 
conditions, and probability of occurrence 
  
Probability of positive 
feedback    
 
 
Cue-Response-
Combination  Training vs. Experiment  Condition 
Number 
of trials Probability of 
occurrence 
 
Cue 1+ Button 1  100%          75%  exp-pos 225/900 25% 
    unexp-neg 75/900 8.3% 
Cue 2 + Button 2   75%             75%  
control-
pos 225/900 25% 
    
control-
neg 75/900 8.3% 
Cue 3 + Button 1/2    0%              25%  unexp-pos 75/900 8.3% 
    exp-neg 225/900 25% 
 
The assignment of the three visual cues to the experimental conditions was counterbalanced 
across participants.  
 
Each trial started with a black fixation cross on a gray screen, having a random duration 
between 2200 to 2700 ms. Subsequently, a black line drawing of a geometrical figure (a circle, 
a triangle, or a star, each presented 16 times; 10.5 x 10.5 cm in size; Bates et al., 2000) was 
presented for 500 ms as an imperative cue. This cue was followed by a black question mark for 
another 2000 ms. During its presentation subjects had to choose one of two buttons on a 
response pad (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). During the training session, cue ‘one’ was 
associated with 100% reward probability for button one. Cue ‘two’ was associated with 75% 
reward probability for button two. Cue ‘three’ was not rewarded at all during training trials; no 
matter which button was selected. After a rewarded button choice, the German word for 
correct (RICHTIG) was presented in black letters on the screen. After a non-rewarded choice, 
the German word for incorrect (FALSCH) was presented. Feedback lasted for 1500 ms. In the 
experimental session (900 trials in total, six blocks) subjects were asked to search for more 
extended button press response patterns based on the previously learned cue-response 
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mappings, e. g. pressing button one twice, and button two three times in five consecutive trials. 
This instruction was used to sustain subjects' expectations regarding the different reward 
probabilities for the three cues during the whole experiment, and to remind subjects of the 
training reward probabilities at the beginning of each new block. However, unknown to the 
subjects, no such button press response pattern existed. We assumed that subjects would 
maintain the original reward probabilities of the training session because they were not able to 
find any advanced response patterns. Although the instruction to search for meta-rules might 
have induced working memory and monitoring processes during the decision phase, this 
instruction was nevertheless necessary to make the occurrence of unexpected feedback 
plausible. During the experimental trials participants were presented with one of the three 
imperative cues each. The assignment of the three different cues to the conditions was 
counterbalanced across subjects. During the presentation of the question mark, subjects had to 
choose between button one or two by pressing the corresponding button. Subsequently, 
feedback was provided for 1500 ms after a short delay of 350 ms to minimize interference by 
movement-related potentials due to the button press. A correct answer was indicated by the 
number 15 in green color presented in the middle of the screen (2 x 1.5 cm in size), equivalent 
to a gain of 15 Euro-cents. After an incorrect answer, the number 15 was displayed in red color 
which indicated a loss of 15 Euro-cents. If no choice was made during the response epoch, 
subjects were informed that they had missed the response, and also lost 15 Euro-cents. After a 
block of 150 trials, overall performance feedback was provided.  
After selecting the previously learned buttons for cue ‘one’ and ‘two’, subjects were provided 
with positive feedback in 75% of the trials. Feedback after cue ‘three’ was positive during 25% 
of the trials. Contrasting these new reward probabilities with those in the training trials, 
subjects encountered trials where a gain was highly expected (cue ‘one’), but a loss occurred, 
i.e., feedback was worse than expected. Likewise, subjects encountered trials where a loss was 
highly expected (cue ‘three’), but a gain occurred, i.e., feedback was better than expected. In 
contrast to the cues ‘one’ and ‘three’, cue ‘two’ was presented with unchanged probabilities for 
gains and losses (75% probability for gain, and 25% probability for loss) in the experimental 
session. Since subjective expectancy levels were not manipulated with cue ‘two’, it served as 
control condition. After three blocks subjects got paid the amount of money they had already 
gained in a five minutes break. This procedure was chosen to maintain the subjects' motivation. 
At the end of the experiment subjects were asked to estimate the reward frequencies of the 
three cues in a short questionnaire. Finally, they were rewarded with the money they had 
gained in the last three blocks. Including a seed capital of five Euros, subjects gained 19.21 +/- 
4.09 Euros on average. At the end they were debriefed that no button press response pattern 
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had existed. The whole experiment took about 70 minutes 
 
Rationale of the task 
In order to explicitly test the hypothesis that the amplitude of the FRN might be sensitive to the 
expectedness of feedback as well as to feedback valence, subjects had to be confronted with 
expected and unexpected positive as well as negative and control feedback (see Table 1). To 
manipulate subjective expectations participants were first asked to learn specific cue-response 
mappings to gain reward, which subsequently could be used to reinforce or violate established 
expectations.  
 
Electroencephalographic recording 
The EEG was recorded via 61 Ag/AgCl electrodes equidistantly embedded in an elastic 
electrode cap (EASYCAP GmbH; model M10, Herrsching, Germany). A balanced sterno-
vertebral site, above the seventh vertebra and the right sterno clavicular joint, served as 
reference site for EEG recordings (Stephenson & Gibbs, 1951). Vertical and horizontal 
electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded with a bipolar setting to allow off-line eye movement 
correction. Electrodes were placed 1 cm above and below the right eye, and on the outer 
canthi. Electrode impedances were controlled by a skin scratching procedure at each electrode 
site prior to EEG recordings. A sterile single-use needle was used to slightly remove dead skin 
cells (Picton & Hillyard, 1972). Afterwards, degassed electrode gel (Electrode-Cap 
International, Inc., Eaton, OH) was filled into each electrode. All electrode impedances were 
kept below 2 kΩ, as checked with an impedance meter. All signals were recorded within a 
frequency range of 0.1 to 125 Hz and sampled at 250 Hz for digital storage. 
 
Data analysis 
 
EEG data 
Prior to analysis, subject- and channel-specific weighting coefficients for vertical and 
horizontal eye movement artifacts were calculated as the ratio of the covariance between each 
EEG channel and the EOG, and the variance within the EOG channels. These parameters were 
obtained in two pre-experimental calibration trials where subjects performed guided vertical 
 41 
and horizontal eye movements (Bauer & Lauber, 1979). Subsequently, the weighted actual 
EOG signals were subtracted from the EEG in the experimental trials. Using a template 
matching procedure, blink coefficients were calculated and subtracted off-line from each EEG 
channel trial-by-trial (Lamm, Fischmeister, & Bauer, 2005, for a detailed description). 
Off-line analysis was carried out using EEGLAB 6.03b (Delorme & Makeig, 2004), 
implemented in Matlab 7.5.0 (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA). EEG data were low-pass 
filtered with a cut-off frequency at 30 Hz (roll-off 6 dB/octave) and epoched for each trial, 
starting 200 ms before feedback onset and lasting for 1200 ms. The 200 ms interval preceding 
stimulus onset served as baseline. Thereafter, extended infomax independent component 
analysis (ICA, Bell & Sejnowski, 1995; Lee, Girolami, & Sejnowski, 1999) was applied to the 
single-subject data to correct for residual eye movement-related activity, as outlined by 
Delorme, Sejnowski, and Makeig (2007). For each subject, individual components were 
screened for maps with a symmetric frontal topography, accounting for eye blinks and vertical 
eye movements. As suggested by Delorme et al. (2007), these components were discarded 
from further analysis by performing a back projection of the remaining components to the 
voltage time series. Subsequently, a semi-automatic artifact removal procedure was applied to 
the back transformed data. Artifact-afflicted trials that met the following criteria were labelled 
and finally rejected after visual inspection: voltage values exceeding +/-75 µV in any channel 
or a voltage drift of more than 75 µV. Due to the experimental setup, expected and control 
positive trials were presented more often than unexpected and control negative trials. To adjust 
the signal-to-noise-ratios, the number of trials of unexpected positive, unexpected negative, 
and control negative feedback was drawn randomly from each expected positive, expected 
negative, and control positive feedback condition for each subject to approximate the number 
of trials in all conditions. Thereafter, each condition contained 33.18 +/- 4.48 trials on average. 
 
ERP data analysis 
Artifact-free trials were averaged per subject and per condition, and grand averages of the six 
conditions were generated. Data were grouped into six conditions with the factors expectation 
and valence: (i) expected positive feedback (cue ‘one’; EXP-POS), (ii) expected negative 
feedback (cue ‘three’; EXP-NEG), (iii) unexpected positive feedback (cue ‘three’; UNEXP-
POS), (iv) unexpected negative feedback (cue ‘one’; UNEXP-NEG), (v) control positive 
feedback (cue ‘two’; CONTROL-POS), and (vi) control negative feedback (cue ‘two’; 
CONTROL-NEG). Subsequently, the peak-to-peak voltage differences between the most 
negative peak 200–350 ms after feedback onset and the preceding positive peak at each of the 
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electrode sites Fz, FCz, and Cz were calculated (Holroyd et al., 2003). This procedure was 
chosen to gain a more veridical account of neuronal activation related to feedback processing, 
as argued by Picton et al. (2000), since the FRN is superimposed on the slow-going P300 
wave. If no FRN peak was apparent, the difference score was set to zero (which occurred in 
3.33% of all cases, mostly after expected positive and control positive conditions). 
Furthermore, we added the factor experimental half with the levels ‘first’ and ‘second’ to the 
analysis, corresponding to the first 50% and the last 50% of the trials in the experiment. If 
subjects ignored the experimental instruction, diminished ERPs after unexpected conditions 
could be expected in the second half of the experiment (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).4 The 
peak-to-peak measures were subjected to a 2x3x3x2 repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with the factors HALF (first, second), LOCATION (electrode sites Fz, FCz, and 
Cz), EXPECTATION (expected, unexpected, control), and VALENCE (positive, negative).  
For P300 analysis, peak-to-peak voltage differences between the most positive value at Pz in 
the time range of 300-500 ms and the preceding negative peak (i.e., N200) were calculated. 
These peak difference values were subjected to a 2x3x2 repeated measures ANOVA with the 
factors HALF (first, second), EXPECTATION (expected, unexpected, control), and 
VALENCE (positive, negative).  
Peak latencies were measured from feedback onset to the corresponding peak amplitudes of the 
FRN (largest at FCz) and of the P300 (measured at Pz). The mean latencies of each subject 
were subjected to two separate 2x3x2 repeated measures ANOVAs with the factors HALF, 
EXPECTATION, and VALENCE. The level of significance was set at p<.05 for all tests. If 
necessary, degrees of freedom were adjusted using Greenhouse-Geisser correction. Significant 
interactions were explored with Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests. To demonstrate the effect size of 
the experimental manipulation, partial eta-squared (ηp2) is reported, where 0.05 represents a 
small effect, 0.10 equals a medium effect, and 0.20 represents a large effect (i.e., describing at 
least 20% of the variance; Cohen, 1973). 
 
 
 
                                            
4
  The model proposed by Rescorla & Wagner (1972) describes Pavlovian conditioning, i. e. the basis of 
the reinforcement learning account of the FRN. The model predicts that a difference between ERPs after 
expected and unexpected feedback should only be observable in the first experimental trials. 
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Results 
 
Behavioral Results 
During the pre-experimental training session,  subjects responded in 92.2% of the cue ‘one’-
trials with button one (100% reward probability), and in 79.4% of the cue ‘two’-trials with 
button two (75% reward probability). Subjects were never rewarded after the presentation of 
cue ‘three’, regardless of their response. Since this feedback provided no information for 
learning a cue-response mapping, they chose button one in 45% and button two in 49.1% of all 
cases. In the remaining 5.9%, subjects were too slow to make a choice. Pair-wise McNemar 
tests showed significant differences in button press preferences. Subjects chose button one 
significantly more often after cue ‘one’ than after cue ‘two’ (χ2(1)=11.72, p<.001), or cue 
‘three’ (χ2(1)=82.39, p< .001). Moreover, subjects chose button two significantly more often 
after cue ‘two’ than after cue ‘one’(χ2(1)=11.72, p<.001), or cue ‘three’ (χ2(1)=29.85, p<.001). 
Thus, subjects learned a strong association between cue ‘one’ and button one, as well as a 
weaker association between cue ‘two’ and button two, but they did not develop any button 
preference for cue ‘three’. In the post-experimental questionnaire, subjects estimated the 
reward frequencies of the three imperative cues. Ratings for positive feedback after cue ‘one’ 
ranged from 60-90% probability of occurrence (median=71.65). Likewise, ratings for positive 
feedback after cue ‘two’ were between 20-85% probability of occurrence (median=70). After 
the presentation of cue ‘three’, estimations for positive feedback lay in the range of 1–70% 
probability of occurrence (median=20). As can be seen the actual frequencies were 
underestimated in all three cases. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test revealed that subjects expected 
positive feedback significantly less often after cue ‘three’ than cue ‘one’ (Z=-3.92, p<.001), or 
cue ‘two’ (Z=-3.93, p<.001). Thus, subjects were aware of the fact that positive feedback was 
presented more often after cues ‘one’ and ‘two’ than after cue ‘three’ which is the premise for 
the perception of the reward contingencies. 
 
ERP data 
ERPs elicited by the six feedback conditions are displayed in Figure 1 for electrode locations 
FCz at which the FRN was largest, and for Pz at which the P300 was measured. In Figure 2, 
the grand mean difference waves (negative minus positive feedback, merged over the whole 
experiment; see Picton et al., 2000) are plotted for expected, unexpected and control outcomes 
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to visualize FRN scalp topography and waveforms. Figure 3 depicts mean FRN amplitudes at 
FCz with standard errors of the six conditions in a bar graph. 
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FIGURE 1. Grand average ERPs  
Grand averages of the six conditions at electrode sites FCz (upper panel) and Pz (lower panel) 
for half 1 (left column) and half 2 (right column; n=20). Negative is drawn upwards per 
convention. Feedback presentation started at 0 ms, which is marked by a ticked vertical line. 
FIGURE 2. Difference wave amplitude courses and scalp topography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upper panel: Amplitude courses of the voltage differences between negative and positive outcomes for 
expected, unexpected and control feedback (n=20) at FCz. Negative is drawn upwards. Lower panel: Scalp 
topographies of the above plotted difference waves. Timings are given relative to the onset of the feedback 
stimuli. Note that half 1 and 2 were merged together here. 
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FIGURE 3. Mean FRN amplitude values at Fcz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Error bars indicate one standard error. 
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FRN – Amplitude and latency 
The ANOVA of the FRN amplitude showed significant main effects for LOCATION, F(1.2, 22.4)=5.63, 
p<.05, ηp2=0.23, EXPECTATION, F(1.1, 21.7)=8.84, p<.01, ηp2=0.31, and VALENCE, F(1, 19)=20.88, 
p<.001, ηp2=0.52. Furthermore, a significant interaction was observed between LOCATION and 
VALENCE, F(1.3, 23.7)=6.78, p<.05, ηp2=0.26). Post-hoc tests revealed that FRN amplitude was 
comparable for Fz and FCz (ns.), but was smaller at Cz than at FCz (p<.01). Moreover, FRN amplitudes 
were larger for negative compared to positive feedback at all electrode locations (all p’s<.05) with less 
pronounced amplitude differences at Cz. FRN amplitude was also larger after unexpected than expected and 
control conditions (both p’s<.05). Mean FRN peak-to-peak difference values and peak latencies for both 
halves and all conditions at FCz are displayed in Table 2. Experimental half had no effect on FRN 
amplitudes. We assumed therefore that subjects had obeyed the instruction to search for meta-rules and thus 
kept the training reward contingencies established during the training phase present throughout the entire 
experiment.5 Regarding the FRN latency analysis at FCz, no significant effects or interactions of any of the 
factors emerged (all p’s>.10).  
                                            
5
  The use of the peak-to-peak-to-peak measure suggested by Yeung & Sanfey (2004) yielded comparable results. A main 
effect of EXPECTATION, F(1.2, 22.4)=25.14, p<.001, ηp
2
=0.57, a main effect of VALENCE, F(1, 19)=34.52, p<.001, 
ηp
2
=0.65, as well as interactions between LOCATION and EXPECTATION, F(2.4, 45.2)=3.42, p<.05, ηp
2
=0.15, and 
LOCATION and VALENCE, F(1.5, 28.2)=4.04, p<.05, ηp
2
=0.18, and an interaction between EXPECTATION and 
VALENCE, F(2, 37.3)=6.49, p<.01, ηp
2
=0.25, were observed. 
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TABLE 2. Mean peak-to-peak amplitude values and mean latencies and corresponding standard deviation 
(SD) of the FRN at FCz, and the P300 at Pz (both n=20) 
 
  FRN (FCz)      P300 (Pz)    
 
 
Condition 
Half 1  
Mean 
amplitudes SD  
Mean 
latenc
y SD  
Mean 
amplitudes SD  
Mean 
latency SD 
 
            
 
 
exp-pos  2.32 1.93  246 35.67  -12.22 4.71  329 76.49 
exp-neg  4.37 2.25  263 37.53  -12.19 3.77  357 63.10 
unexp-pos  4.01 3.36  261 39.95  -17.68 5.91  350 69.65 
unexp-neg  5.88 3.47  256 22.29  -16.62 5.72  389 75.49 
control-pos  1.81 1.68  265 49.37  -12.25 4.54  321 73.50 
control-neg  4.99 3.28  262 21.62  -14.63 4.30  397 70.45 
            
 
 
Condition 
Half 2  
Mean 
amplitudes SD  
Mean 
latenc
y SD  
Mean 
amplitudes SD  
Mean 
latency SD 
 
exp-pos  2.32 3.09  248 33.49  -9.93 4.37  336 80.72 
exp-neg  4.32 3.16  251 18.38  -10.90 4.25  353 56.93 
unexp-pos  4.10 3.48  258 31.75  -17.55 6.56  343 60.46 
unexp-neg  5.69 3.74  262 36.3  -16.00 5.25  396 76.51 
control-pos  2.62 3.19  259 35.29  -9.95 5.50  316 64.59 
control-neg  4.97 4.33  262 30.83  -15.42 5.27  395 71.70 
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P300 – Amplitude and latency 
The analysis of peak-to-peak amplitude differences at electrode site Pz revealed a main effect for 
EXPECTATION, F(2, 38)= 40.82, p<.001, ηp2=0.68, and a significant interaction between 
EXPECTATION and VALENCE, F(2, 38)=11.61, p<.001, ηp2=0.38. A post-hoc test indicated that 
unexpected feedback, no matter whether positive or negative, elicited larger P300 amplitudes than expected 
feedback (all p’s<.05). Furthermore, both unexpected feedback conditions elicited larger P300 amplitudes 
than the positive control condition (both p’s<.001). A valence effect on expectation level was only 
observable for the control condition with larger P300 amplitudes for negative control feedback compared to 
positive control feedback (p<.05) which can be explained by the lower probability of occurrence of negative 
control feedback than positive control feedback. Experimental half had no effect on P300 amplitudes.   
For P300 latency significant main effects for EXPECTATION, F(2, 38)=4.60, p<.05, ηp2 =0.20, and  
VALENCE, F(1, 19)=34.11, p<.001, ηp2=0.64 were observed, which were subsumed under a significant 
EXPECTATION x  VALENCE interaction, F(2, 38)=7.59, p<.01, ηp2=0.29. The post-hoc test indicated 
that positive feedback yielded shorter P300 latencies after unexpected and control feedback (both p’s<.05), 
but not after expected feedback.  
Mean P300 peak-to-peak difference values and latencies are shown in Table 2. 
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated reward-related feedback processing using a probabilistic gambling paradigm 
in which participants encountered expected, unexpected, and neutral (i.e., control) positive and negative 
feedback. Subjects' expectations were built-up in a training session and then manipulated in the 
experimental session. In line with previous studies, negative valence was a good predictor for large FRN 
amplitudes. However, expectation level was another valuable predictor for FRN amplitude, i. e., the FRN 
amplitude was larger after unexpected as compared to control and expected feedback. These two factors - 
unexpectedness and negative valence - had comparable effects regarding the processing of decision 
outcomes. Thus, the FRN indicated mainly a negative reward prediction error, but to a lesser extent also a 
positive reward prediction error. The P300 was largest after unexpected and control negative feedback, thus 
coding unexpected events.  
Our findings are in line with Wu and Zhou (2009) who suggested that the prediction error reflected by the 
FRN is not only defined in terms of valence, but also in terms of whether a pre-established expectancy is 
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fulfilled or not, regardless of whether expectancy was induced trial-by-trial-wise or block-wise. Thus, the 
conclusion that the FRN represents the evaluation of the motivational impact of outcomes (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002) via factors such as valence and expectedness is highly plausible.  
 
The FRN and prediction errors 
The most pronounced FRN amplitudes of the data at hand were observed after unexpected negative 
outcomes, which were most unfavourable for the subjects. These results corroborate the assumption of the 
RL-theory of the FRN amplitude depending on the relation between actual and expected outcome 
(Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd et al., 2004; Wu & Zhou, 2009). Nevertheless, findings about the effect of 
expectation level on the FRN amplitude and the effect of positive feedback are not conclusive, as several 
studies reported divergent results. Shortly after Holroyd and Coles (2002) announced the RL-theory, the 
FRN was interpreted in terms of the absence of a negative deflection after positive feedback (Hajcak et al., 
2005; Holroyd et al., 2003; Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008). This interpretation changed 
recently, and by now research claims that a small negativity can be found after positive feedback (Hajcak et 
al., 2007; Moser & Simons, 2009). For example, inducing trial-by-trial expectations, Hajcak et al. (2007) 
did find small FRN amplitudes after unexpected reward, indicating a positive reward prediction error 
comparable to the present study. Similarly, Oliveira, McDonald, and Goodman (2007) postulated in their 
expectancy-deviation hypothesis that deviations from previously built-up expectations serve as strong agent 
eliciting FRN-like components. Their subjects encountered unexpected false-positive feedback in a time 
estimation task. However, subjects may have thought of a malfunction of the experimental set-up and 
interpreted the false-positive feedback as error feedback. Along these lines, a study by Ehlis, Herrmann, 
Bernhard, and Fallgatter (2005) showed that so called “PC-errors” (i.e., errors that were declared as 
computer-generated) elicited smaller error-related ERPs than “person-related errors” (i.e., errors that were 
generated by the subjects themselves), which could explain the negative deflection after false positive 
feedback in the Oliveira study (2007). To avoid the interpretation of unexpected positive feedback as PC-
error, the present study used the aforementioned task instruction of the meta-rule search. Also, Wu and 
Zhou (2009) observed enhanced FRN amplitudes for violations of expectancy regarding the magnitude of 
the reward during their gambling task. The authors conclude that prediction errors are not solely defined in 
terms of valence, but also in terms of whether the actual outcome fits a pre-established expectancy or not.  
In the present study all feedback stimuli were motivationally salient, indicating monetary gain or loss, and 
they had to be processed in the context of the previously built-up response contingencies. We propose that 
the FRN is indicating a mismatch between internal and external representations indexed by the ACC to 
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extract positive and negative motivational salient outcomes. Unexpected feedback can also be described as 
a discrepancy (i.e., conflict) between internal and external feedback representations, which will require 
behavioural adaptations. Furthermore, the more predictable the feedback is, the less motivational value it 
contains for acquiring new behavioural strategies (e. g. less conflict is present). The low motivational value 
of expected feedback can explain the nearly absent FRN after expected positive and control positive 
feedback and the tendency of smaller FRNs after expected negative and control negative feedback, as 
compared to unexpected negative feedback, in the present data. However, another explanation for negative 
ERP deflections after unexpected positive feedback is offered by Holroyd et al. (2008). The authors claim 
that conflict-related processes are reflected in enhanced N200 amplitudes. This conflict-related negative 
deflection could be reduced after unexpected positive feedback because of simultaneous increase in 
mesencephalic dopamine activity due to unpredicted feedback since both processes are likely to be 
mediated by the ACC (Botvinick et al., 2001). 
Extending the notion of Yeung et al. (2005) of the FRN indicating motivational salient events, we propose 
that such events might be discrepant or mismatching, and that they may comprise the dimensions of 
negative valence (Hajcak et al., 2006; Holroyd et al., 2003; Miltner et al., 1997), of unexpectedness 
(Bellebaum & Daum, 2008; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd et al., 2004), or of differing 
reward magnitude (Goyer, Woldorff, & Huettel, 2008). In line with this argumentation, Goyer et al. (2008) 
observed larger FRNs after negative feedback in Gehring and Willoughby’s (2002) gambling paradigm also 
for unchosen options. The authors hypothesized that the FRN was also influenced by contextual factors 
such as prior outcome history, and concluded that the motivational significance of the outcome is most 
important for error processing, since even early ERP signals are sensitive to the degree of an error, i. e. the 
representational mismatch it is causing. 
Assuming that unexpected outcomes imply more motivational significance than expected outcomes via the 
mismatch, more pronounced outcome-related ERPs would be predicted for them. Indeed, this assumption is 
corroborated by observations where amplitudes of error signals were altered by manipulating contextual 
task properties leading to changes of motivational outcome aspects. For example, studies emphasizing 
speed over accuracy, thus devaluating the subjective significance of errors, have shown a decrease of error-
related ERPs (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, & Hoorman, 1995; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). 
Decreased error-related ERPs were also observed in studies where subjects scoring high on negative 
emotionality tests lost motivation in the course of the experiment (Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000). In line 
with these arguments, Holroyd and Coles (2008) reported that error-related amplitudes rather reflected the 
subjective value of a previous action like the original cue-response-contingencies of the present study, as 
opposed to simple good vs. bad-evaluation per se. Likewise, Moser and Simons (2009) suggested that the 
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FRN signals the integration of information about current and past actions and emotions. 
 
The P300 and feedback processing  
The P300 wave, a positive-going ERP component, is typically investigated in oddball-paradigms, where it 
is evoked when participants are attending to infrequent target stimuli. Its amplitude is maximal over parietal 
electrode sites (Snyder & Hillyard, 1976). The amplitude of the P300 increases with decreasing stimulus 
frequency, i.e., decreasing probability of the stimulus (Donchin & Coles, 1988). In the present study, the 
P300 was most prominent during less frequent feedback conditions (unexpected positive and negative, 
control negative), which were also subjectively less probable for participants. Therefore, subjective reward 
probability is the likely candidate to have induced larger P300 amplitudes after more unexpected feedback 
regardless of valence. In accordance with the context updating hypothesis (Donchin & Coles, 1988), 
unexpected events require updating of representations in working memory and therefore elicit larger P300s.  
Although visual inspection might indicate that unexpected positive feedback induced the largest P300 
amplitudes, no significant difference to unexpected negative feedback was observed. Therefore, the present 
results support the a priori hypothesis of the P300 being insensitive to feedback valence (Yeung & Sanfey, 
2004). In contrast to Wu and Zhou (2009) feedback probability was coded by the FRN as well as the P300 
in the present study. The authors explained their missing P300 probability effect via the possibility that they 
induced expectations about reward magnitude and not about reward valence. Hence, they concluded that the 
P300 might encode only the most significant feedback property when there are conflicting levels of 
relevance. Since only feedback expectancy and valence competed for attention in the present study, it might 
be the observed inconsistency between the presented cue and expectations after the button press that led to 
working memory updating processes. Whether or not the P300 is involved in coding the motivational 
significance of rewards as suggested by Nieuwenhius et al. (2005) remains a question of debate then. 
The observed differences in P300 latencies can be explained in terms of stimulus evaluation processes. The 
P300 latency is thought to be modulated by stimulus classification demands; it is delayed if stimulus or 
distractor features are ambiguous (Kutas, McCarthy, & Donchin, 1977). In general, positive feedback, e. g. 
a gain of 15 Euro-cents, yielded shorter P300 latencies than negative feedback after unexpected and control 
feedback. This indicates that stimulus evaluation was easiest in these conditions. In line with parts of these 
results, Yeung et al. (2005) reported longer P300 latencies for losses; so it might be possible that the 
combination of lower probability and negative valence had a significant influence on the stimulus 
evaluation and delayed it via top-down processes. 
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Conclusions 
To sum up, the present data indicate that feedback attributes such as expectancy and valence are coded by 
the FRN which is sensitive mostly to unexpected negative feedback, but also to unexpected positive 
feedback. For the data at hand, the FRN can be described in terms of a reinforcement learning signal 
indicating a mismatch between internal and external representations regardless of stimulus valence or 
expectedness. This mismatch is likely to be indexed by the ACC to extract positive and negative 
motivationally salient outcomes.  
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Abstract 
 
This study investigated the relationship between feedback processing and antisocial personality traits. 
While event-related potentials were recorded, participants encountered expected and unexpected 
feedback during a gambling task. Feedback consisted either of emotional faces or numerical stimuli 
indicating monetary gain or loss.  
When emotional faces served as feedback stimuli (experiment 1), only antisocial subjects showed 
enhanced P300 amplitudes after unexpected feedback. When numerical stimuli served as feedback 
stimuli (experiment 2), the feedback-related negativity (FRN) after losses tended to be enhanced in 
antisocial subjects. Furthermore, P300 latency was prolonged after expected feedback in antisocials. 
These results suggest that external feedback is salient to antisocials, and moreover, that emotional 
reactivity is intact or even enhanced in antisocial subjects. Apparently, antisocials seem to care about 
external feedback when unexpected emotional expressions or monetary reinforcers are involved. 
 
Keywords: antisocial personality, feedback processing, FRN, P300 
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1. Introduction   
Deficits in action monitoring are common phenomena in psychopathology. Prolonged response 
inhibition (Enticott, Ogloff, & Bradshaw, 2008) and reduced error-related amplitudes (e. g., Alain, 
McNeely, He, Christensen, & West, 2002) were observed in schizophrenia, as well as increased error-
related activation in patients suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; Gehring, Himle, & 
Nisenson, 2000; Hajcak & Simmons, 2002). A related construct to psychopathology is psychopathy, 
which is a personality construct described by a variety of affective abnormalities, such as callousness, 
lack of empathy, lack of remorse, and antisocial personality traits (Cleckley, 1964; Hare, 1991). 
Comparable to other forms of psychopathology, psychopathy is associated with arousal-based deficits, 
e. g. the disrupted processing of emotional facial expressions, in particular fearful expressions (Blair et 
al., 2004; Montagne et al., 2005), or reduced physiological responsiveness to aversive conditioning 
stimuli (Birbaumer et al., 2005). These deficits have been associated with altered anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) activation. The ACC is a brain region central for the integration of cognitive, affective, 
and visceral information (Allman, Hakeem, Erwin, Nimchinsky, & Hof, 2001; Critchley, 2005; Thayer 
& Lane, 2000). This region is thought to be involved in action monitoring and the assessment of the 
motivational significance of external stimuli (Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995), as well as the 
processing of affective information (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000).  
An event-related potential (ERP) component related to performance monitoring and ACC function is 
the so-called ‘Feedback-Related Negativity’ (FRN, Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997; Nieuwenhuis, 
Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004a). The FRN is a negative going 
deflection over frontal electrode sites occuring 200 to 300 ms after external feedback on negative 
performance or monetary loss. It is thought to be generated in or near the ACC (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). Holroyd and Coles (2002) postulated 
that the FRN is a reinforcement signal induced by the mesencephalic dopamine system which is 
conveyed to the ACC to optimize new action-outcome relations. Furthermore, these authors assumed 
that events worse than expected would elicit the largest amplitude deflections. In contrast, Gehring and 
Willoughby (2002) stated that the FRN might rather reflect the subjective negative evaluation of self-
relevant information than the commission of an error per se. Following their hypothesis, it has been 
proposed to view the FRN as a reinforcement signal which is detecting mismatch between internal and 
external representations to emphasize motivationally salient outcomes (Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 
2005; Pfabigan, Alexopoulos, Sailer, & Bauer, 2009). Since psychopathology is known to affect 
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motivation, the amplitude of the FRN is prone to also be affected. For example, reduced FRN 
amplitudes have been observed in depressive subjects (Foti & Hajcak, 2009). Similarly, a trend towards 
abnormal FRN amplitudes has been reported in OCD patients (Gründler, Cavanagh, Figueroa, Frank, & 
Allen, 2009; Nieuwenhuis, Nielen, Mol, Hajcak, & Veltmann, 2005). Investigating a personality 
construct related to psychopathology, Hirsh and Inzlicht (2008) explored the influence of Neuroticism 
on feedback processing. The authors assumed that neurotic subjects showed  enhanced responses to 
uncertainty due to enhanced emotional responsiveness of the ACC (Bush et al., 2000), which actually 
was reflected in the FRN amplitude. To date, only one study related feedback processing and 
psychopathy (von Borries, Brazil, Bulten, Buitelaar, Verkes, & de Bruijn, 2009). These authors found 
impaired learning in a group of psychopaths during a probabilistic learning task, but FRN amplitudes 
comparable to a control sample. 
The P300 has been associated with antisocial behavior. Peaking around 300 to 600 ms after stimulus 
onset at posterior recording sites, the P300 is reported to be sensitive to stimulus significance and 
probability of occurrence (Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Johnson & Donchin, 1980). Increased 
P300 amplitude is thought to reflect enhanced stimulus processing capability by indexing the allocation 
of neural resources (Polich, 2003). P300 amplitude modulation was found in decision and outcome 
evaluation tasks, probably reflecting the functional or motivational significance of the feedback stimuli 
(Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, & Simmons, 2005; Luu, Shane, Pratt, & Tucker, 2009; Yeung and Sanfey, 
2004b; Yeung et al., 2005). Ambiguous results have been reported regarding the relationship between 
P300 amplitude and antisocial behavior since various P300 paradigms were used to assess emotional 
deficits in antisocial subjects (see Gao & Raine, 2009). Recently, Hicks et al. (2007) suggested that 
P300 reduction might be specifically associated with antisocial characteristics of psychopathy. 
Since antisocial personality traits are a core symptom in psychopathy, the relationship between non-
pathological antisocial personality traits and feedback processing was investigated in the current study 
by means of FRN and P300 in detail for the first time. Subjects were presented with a gambling task 
using external feedback. The feedback stimuli varied in their emphasis on emotional or motivational 
content across experiments. In the first experiment feedback was given via emotional face expressions 
indirectly indicating gain or loss, thus emphasizing the emotional content of the feedback. Emotional 
faces are valid social cues which act as social reinforcers (Rolls, 2000). In the second experiment, 
numerical feedback directly indicated monetary gain or loss, thus stressing more the motivational 
aspect of the feedback. Money is a well-known secondary reinforcer bearing high motivational value. 
In general, we expected negative and unexpected feedback to evoke the largest FRN amplitudes as 
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suggested by Holroyd and Coles (2002) and Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004). In particular, we expected 
antisocial subjects to be less sensitive to these external feedback stimuli than social subjects because of 
the former groups’ deficits in emotional reactivity (Cleckley, 1976; Blair et al., 2004), which should be 
reflected in smaller FRN amplitudes. With respect to the P300, larger amplitudes with unexpected than 
expected feedback were expected (Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977). Moreover, smaller P300 
amplitudes in antisocial than social subjects were expected since P300 reduction has been suggested to 
be a biological marker of vulnerability to externalizing disorders, e. g. problems in impulse control 
(Hicks et al., 2007; Krueger, 1999). Furthermore, P300 latencies were expected to be prolonged in 
antisocial subjects (Gao & Raine, 2009). 
 
2. EXPERIMENT 1 
In a gambling paradigm antisocial and social participants encountered expected and unexpected 
positive and negative feedback outcomes. The feedback stimuli consisted of social cues, i. e., emotional 
faces, indicating correct or incorrect responses. This way we attempted to test the hypothesis that 
antisocial subjects would show reduced FRN and P300 amplitudes than more social subjects when 
processing emotionally salient social feedback stimuli. 
 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants and measures 
Initially, twenty right-handed female students of the University of Vienna participated. The data of two 
participants had to be excluded from further analysis due to severe artifacts (continuous excessive alpha 
rhythm). The mean age of the remaining 18 subjects was 23.4 +/- 4.0 years. Handedness was assessed 
by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and were free of neurological or psychiatric diseases. The study was conducted in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and local guidelines of the University of Vienna. Informed 
written consent was obtained from each participant prior to participation. At the end of the experiment 
each participant received a bonus of 15 Euros for participation. Prior to EEG data collection, subjects 
completed a personality questionnaire (Persönlichkeits-Stil und Störungs-Inventar, PSSI; Kuhl & 
Kazén, 1997). The PSSI is a self-assessment tool covering the relative manifestation of 14 personality 
traits as the non-pathologic personality representations of personality disorders described in the DSM-
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IV (American Psychiatric Association) and the ICD-10 (World Health Organization) diagnostic 
criteria. For this study, in particular the so-called AS (antisociality)-scale of the PSSI (self-determined 
personality and antisocial personality disorder) was in focus. Its reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.86 - AS-
scale) and validity are reported to be satisfactory. High T-values on the AS-scale, which consists of ten 
items (e.g., “If people turn against me, I can wear them down.”), characterize people with self-
determined and inconsiderate behaviour to achieve individual goals. They are described to act self-
confidently, offending and humiliating while interacting with others, and furthermore to have problems 
adjusting to social and legal norms. Participants’ average score on the AS-scale was T=50.33 
(SD=11.11), ranging from 31 to 72. Participants were divided into three groups based on whether their 
T-values lay approximately below, above, or within two thirds of the sample’s standard deviation. Six 
subjects formed the ‘social’ group (mean T=39.33, SD=4.55, range 31-42), six subjects the ‘middle’ 
group (mean T=49.00, SD=3.69, range 45-54), and the remaining six subjects constituted the 
‘antisocial’ group (mean T=62.67, SD=7.45, range 56-72). Only the six social and the six antisocial 
subjects were considered for analysis. The T-values of these two groups differed significantly from 
each other (independent samples t-test: t(10)=-6.55, p<.001). 
 
2.1.2. Task 
Stimulus presentation and synchronous multi-channel electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings were 
controlled by a Pentium IV 3.00 GHz computer using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). Subjects were comfortably seated 70 cm in front of a cathode ray tube 
monitor. The paradigm used was identical to that described in Pfabigan et al. (2009). An experimental 
session began with a training run of 48 trials where subjects learned specific cue-response-
contingencies for the forthcoming experimental task. Each trial started with a black fixation cross on a 
grey screen, followed by an imperative cue consisting of a black line drawing of a simple figure (circle, 
triangle, or star, each presented 16 times; 10.5 x 10.5 cm in size; Bates et al., 2000). During the 
subsequent presentation of a black question mark, subjects had to choose one of two buttons on a 
response pad. Feedback was provided afterwards. The imperative cue remained on the screen for 500 
ms; the question mark appeared immediately following the cue offset and remained on the screen until 
the participant responded or 2000 ms had elapsed. About 350 ms after the offset of the question mark 
the feedback stimulus appeared on the screen for 700 ms. During the inter-trial-interval, the fixation 
cross was presented again for a random duration of 2200 to 2700 ms. In the training session, one of the 
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three imperative cues was associated with 100% reward probability for button one (cue ‘one’), another 
cue was associated with 75% reward probability for button two (cue ‘two’). Irrespective of button 
choice the third cue was not rewarded at all (cue ‘three’). The German word for correct (RICHTIG) 
was presented after reward-linked button choices and that for incorrect (FALSCH) with all other 
choices. The assignment of the three cues to the different reward probabilities was counterbalanced 
across subjects. After having learnt these simple cue-response-mappings the experimental session 
consisting of 900 trials started. Subjects were now asked to search for more complex button press 
response patterns on the basis of these simple cue-response-mappings (e.g., pressing button one thrice, 
and button two twice in five consecutive trials). This instruction was chosen to sustain participants’ 
expectations regarding the different reward probabilities for the three cues during the whole 
experiment. However, unknown to the participants, no such button press response pattern existed. 
Although this instruction to search for meta-rules might have induced monitoring and working memory 
processes during the decision phase, it was indispensable for making the occurrence of unexpected 
feedback plausible.  
Feedback stimuli consisted of pictures of faces with emotional expressions taken from the standardized 
Ekman series (Ekman & Friesen, 1976; 4 x 5 cm in size). Two male and two female faces showing the 
emotions ‘happiness’ and ‘anger’ were used as positive (‘happy’ face) and negative (‘angry’ face) 
feedback stimuli; valence and gender were balanced across experimental trials. Participants were made 
familiar with the emotional faces during task instruction. Correct choices were indicated by the central 
presentation of a happy face, incorrect choices by an angry face. Subjects were informed that they 
could earn 10 to 15 Euros depending on their task performance, i.e., the number of correct responses. In 
contrast to the training session, subjects were now provided with positive feedback in 75% of the trials 
where they selected the previously learned buttons for cue ‘one’ and ‘two’. With cue ‘three’ subjects 
were provided with positive feedback in 25% of these trials. This contrast between the new reward 
contingencies and those of the training session ensured that participants encountered trials where a gain 
was highly expected (cue ‘one’), but a loss occurred, i.e., feedback was worse than expected. Likewise, 
subjects encountered trials where a loss was highly expected (cue ‘three’), but a gain occurred, i.e., 
feedback was better than expected. The data corresponding to cue ‘two’ were not further analysed since 
subjective expectation levels had not changed with this cue (75% probability for gain during the 
training and the experimental session). Nevertheless, cue ‘two’ was essential in this experimental 
paradigm - otherwise the occurrence of unexpected feedback stimuli would not have been plausible to 
the subjects (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Reward probabilities in training and experimental sessions, classification of conditions, and 
probability of occurrence in both studies. 
 
 
After each of the six experimental blocks participants were given an overall performance feedback by 
means of the number of correct responses. Subsequently, they were instructed to search for a new 
button press response pattern during the next block. A five minute break took place after three blocks to 
allow subjects a short period of rest. After the six blocks subjects were asked to estimate in a brief 
questionnaire the obtained reward frequencies per cue. Afterwards the participants were told that they 
had performed extremely well – and regardless of their points accomplished - all were paid the full 
amount of money. Finally, they were debriefed about the external feedback manipulation. The whole 
experiment took about 70 minutes. 
 
2.1.3. Data Acquisition and Preprocessing 
The EEG was recorded via 61 Ag/AgCl ring electrodes, arranged equidistantly in an elastic electrode 
Probability of positive feedback
Training Experiment Condition
Cue 1+ Button 1 100% 75% exp-pos 225/900 25%
unexp-neg 75/900 8.3%
Cue 2 - Button 2 75% 75% 
Cue 3 + Button 1/2 0% 25% unexp-pos 75/900 8.3%
exp-neg 225/900 25%
The assignment of the three visual cues to the experimental conditions was counterbalanced across
participants.
Cue-Response-
Combination
Number 
of trials
Probability of 
occurence
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cap (EASYCAP GmbH, Herrsching, Germany; model M10). A balanced sterno-vertebral reference was 
used (Stephenson & Gibbs, 1951). Vertical and horizontal electrooculograms (EOG) were recorded 
bipolarily with electrodes placed 1 cm above and below the left eye and on the outer canthi, 
respectively to enable off-line eye movement artifact correction. During two pre-experimental 
calibration trials, subjects performed vertical and horizontal eye movements. These data were used to 
calculate subject- and channel-specific coefficients for eye movement correction (Bauer & Lauber, 
1979). Skin scratching at each recording site (see Picton & Hillyard, 1972) and degassed conductance 
gel ensured electrode impedances below 2 kΩ. All signals were recorded within a frequency range of 
0.016 to 125 Hz and sampled at 250 Hz for digital storage. 
Off-line and prior to analysis the weighted EOG signals were subtracted from the EEG signals 
accordingly. Subsequently, blink coefficients were calculated using a template matching procedure and 
blink artifacts were also subtracted from the EEG signals (see Lamm et al., 2005). EEGLAB 6.03b 
(Delorme & Makeig, 2004) was used for further analysis. A low-pass filter (cut-off frequency 30 Hz, 
roll-off 6dB per octave) was applied to the EEG data. For ERP analysis signal epochs started 200 ms 
before feedback onset and lasted 900 ms; the mean of the first 200 ms serving as baseline. Before 
applying extended (infomax) independent component analysis (ICA, Bell & Sejnowski, 1995; Lee, 
Girolami, & Sejnowski, 1999) trials contaminated by muscular or movement artifacts were rejected 
based on visual inspection. ICA was performed to remove residual ocular artifacts, as described in 
Delorme, Sejnowski, & Makeig (2007), and afterwards a semi-automatic artifact removal procedure 
was done to eliminate epochs containing voltage values exceeding +/-75 µV in any channel.  
Due to the experimental set-up the data sets per subject consisted of three times as many expected 
feedback trials than unexpected feedback trials. Therefore, numbers of trials per condition were 
equalized per subject in order to adjust for the signal-to-noise ratio of the ERPs. According to the total 
number of unexpected positive feedback trials, the same number out of all expected positive feedback 
trials was randomly drawn per subject.  The same procedure was applied to the unexpected and 
expected negative feedback trials. As a result, each experimental condition contained on average 60.78 
+/- 5.17 trials per person. 
 
2.1.4. Data Analysis  
Artifact-free epochs were averaged separately for each subject and each of the following four 
conditions: (1) expected positive feedback (exp-pos; cue ‘one’), (2) expected negative feedback (exp-
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neg; cue ‘three’), (3) unexpected positive feedback (unexp-pos; cue ‘three’), and (4) unexpected 
negative feedback (unexp-neg; cue ‘one’).To assess the FRN amplitudes at electrode sites Fz, FCz, and 
Cz voltage differences between the most negative voltage peak between 200 and 400 ms after feedback 
onset (FRN) and the average voltage value of its immediately preceding and following positive peaks 
were calculated (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004b). This procedure was chosen to achieve a more reliable 
account of neuronal activation in relation to feedback processing, as argued by Picton et al. (2000), 
because of the FRN being superimposed on the slow positive going P300. P300 amplitudes were 
obtained by searching for local maxima between 300 and 500 ms after feedback onset at electrode site 
Pz.  
FRN amplitude differences were analyzed by means of a mixed 2x3x2x2 ANOVA with the between-
subject factor group (social, antisocial), and the within-subject factors location (Fz, FCz, Cz), 
expectation (expected, unexpected), and valence (positive, negative). P300 latency was defined as the 
time elapsed between feedback onset and the P300 peak amplitude. The effect of factors group, 
expectation, and valence on the P300 peak amplitude and latency at Pz was analyzed by means of a 
mixed 2x2x2 ANOVA. Significant interactions were further analyzed by Tukey HSD post-hoc tests. If 
necessary, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for repeated 
measures. To demonstrate the effect size of the ANOVA models, partial eta-squared (ηp
2
) is reported. 
Small effects are represented by scores < 0.05, medium effects by scores around 0.10, and large effects 
by scores > 0.20 (Cohen, 1973).  
 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1. Behavioral Results 
In the training session, subjects responded in 84% of cue ‘one’-trials with button one (100% reward 
probability), and in 78.8% of cue ‘two’-trials with button two (75%). With cue ‘three’-trials, subjects 
chose button one in 43.6%, and button two in 48.1% of all cases. In the remaining 8.4%, subjects were 
too slow to respond. Pair-wise McNemar tests showed significant differences in button press 
preferences. Button one was chosen significantly more often after cue ‘one’ than cue ‘three’ 
(χ
2
(1)
=52.41, p<.001). In the post-experimental questionnaire, subjects estimated the probability of 
occurrence of positive feedback after cue ‘one’ with a median of 73% [60;90], after cue ‘two’ with a 
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median of 70% [50;80], and after cue ‘three’ with a median of 33% [2;40]. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
test revealed that positive feedback was expected significantly more often after cue ‘one’ than cue 
‘three’ (Z=-3.74, p<.001). 
 
2.2.2. FRN 
Main effects for location (F(2,12)=17.06, p<.0001, ηp
2
=0.63), expectation (F(1,10)=14.06, p<.05, 
ηp
2
=0.58), as well as a two-way interaction of location and expectation (F(2,13)=5.09, p<.05, ηp
2
=0.34), 
and a three-way interaction of group, location, and expectation (F(2,13)=7.74, p<.05, ηp
2
=0.44) were 
observed. For social subjects, larger FRN amplitudes for unexpected than expected feedback were 
apparent at electrode sites Fz (p<0.05) and FCz (p<0.05); whereas antisocial subjects showed larger 
FRN amplitudes after unexpected than expected feedback at all three electrodes (all p’s<.001). 
However, no group differences regarding valence or expectation emerged. The factor valence just 
missed significance (F(1,10)=4.79, p=.054, ηp
2
=0.32), with larger FRN amplitudes for negative 
feedback. Figure 1 depicts amplitude courses of the two groups. 
 
2.2.3. P300 
For the factor expectation, a main effect (F(1,10)=25.25, p<.01, ηp
2
=0.72), an interaction with valence 
(F(1,10)=9.67, p<.05, ηp
2
=0.49), as well as an interaction with group (F(1,10)=6.69, p<.05, ηp
2
=0.40) 
were observed. Unexpected positive (p<0.05) and unexpected negative (p<0.05) feedback elicited 
larger P300 amplitudes than expected positive feedback in all subjects. Additionally and regardless of 
valence, the P300 amplitudes of antisocial subjects were significantly larger for unexpected than for 
expected feedback (p<.05). In contrast, the P300 amplitudes of social subjects were not different for 
unexpected and expected feedback. No group effects regarding valence emerged. Also P300 latency 
did not show any significant differences. 
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Figure 1. Grand average ERPs of Experiment 1 
Grand averages at electrode sites FCz (upper panel) and Pz (lower panel) for negative (right column) and 
positive (left column) feedback conditions differentiating social and antisocial subjects for Experiment 1. 
Negative is drawn upwards per convention, feedback presentation started at 0 ms. 
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2.3 Discussion 
With emotional feedback stimuli, enhanced FRN amplitudes were observed after unexpected feedback 
in all subjects. Negative feedback conditions tended to elicit larger FRN amplitudes in all subjects. 
However, as opposed to our hypothesis, antisocial subjects did not show any FRN amplitude reduction 
in comparison to social subjects. In general, P300 amplitudes were larger after unexpected feedback in 
antisocial subjects but not in social subjects regardless of valence. Neither amplitude reduction in 
antisocials nor differences in processing speed were apparent for the present data. 
In general, the larger FRN amplitudes after unexpected compared to expected feedback may indicate 
that the facial stimuli used were motivationally salient to all subjects in a comparable way. In this 
experiment, correct responses resulted in positive feedback stimuli. Subjects were told that monetary 
incentives were dependent on the number of correct responses accumulated over all trials. Therefore, 
the coupling of the feedback stimuli to monetary gain or loss was indirect. That might explain why 
negative feedback may have been less salient for subjects and did not lead to a significant FRN 
enhancement.  
Interestingly, unexpected feedback conditions yielded larger P300 amplitudes only in the antisocial 
group, although unexpected stimuli have been reported to generally evoke larger P300 amplitudes due 
to their lower expectancy of occurrence (Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977).  Working memory 
processes might be a key to explain this result: according to Kok (2001) high memory load is 
accompanied by reduced P300 amplitudes which would imply that antisocial subjects processed 
unexpected feedback stimuli with less cognitive effort. However, FRN results do not support this 
notion because no FRN group differences emerged. Additionally, the feedback stimuli itself were the 
same for expected and unexpected conditions, thus ruling out the possibility of stimulus properties 
being related to working memory load.  
Recent studies discussed whether or not P300 amplitude might reflect the evaluation of functional 
significance of feedback stimuli (Hajcak et al., 2005; Luu et al, 2009; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004b). If the 
P300 amplitude is indicating motivational significance, larger amplitudes would indicate larger 
stimulus salience. The P300 amplitude might emphasize the fact that antisocials cared more about 
unexpected stimuli because of reduced frustration tolerance. Indeed, a reduction in frustration tolerance 
was reported as a well-known symptom of psychopathic individuals (Hare, 1999). 
To sum up, the assumption of emotional processing deficits in psychopathy indexed by FRN and P300 
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amplitudes was not corroborated by this experiment, although emotional stimuli were used. Since 
antisocial individuals are reported to show active and inconsiderate goal-directed behavior to obtain 
monetary incentives (Cornell et al., 1996), we hypothesized that the FRN and P300 amplitudes effects 
for social and antisocial subjects would disappear after enhancing the motivational feedback content 
while simultaneously reducing the emotional content. Hence, more emphasis was put on the 
motivational stimuli content using feedback stimuli that more directly indicated monetary 
reinforcement. This assumption was tested in experiment 2.   
 
3. EXPERIMENT 2 
In the second experiment, we used the same paradigm as in experiment 1, but with numbers instead of 
emotional faces as feedback stimuli. All changes from experiment 1 are reported.  
 
3.1. Methods 
3.1.1. Participants 
Initially, twenty right-handed students of the University of Vienna (thereof ten women) participated in 
this study. The data of one male participant had to be excluded due to data acquisition problems. The 
mean age of the remaining 19 subjects was 26.3 +/- 3.1 years. The study was conducted in accordance 
with the Declaration of Helsinki and local guidelines of the University of Vienna. Informed written 
consent was obtained from each participant prior to participation. At the end of the experiment subjects 
received an individually adjusted bonus depending on their performance in the experimental task 
(between 10 and 25 Euros). Again, the PSSI questionnaire was administered before EEG data 
collection. Participants scored with an average T-value of 48.84 (SD=9.90) on the AS-scale, individual 
T-values ranged from 34 to 66. Based on the distribution of these individual T-scores, participants were 
separated into three groups (approximately below, above and within two thirds of the sample’s standard 
deviation). Five subjects formed the 'social' group (mean T=36.40, SD=2.51, range 34-40; two 
females), seven subjects formed the 'middle' group (mean T=47.57, SD=4.86, range 42-54; four 
females), and seven subjects constituted the 'antisocial' group (mean T=59.00, SD=3.83, range 55-66; 
four females). There was no influence of sex on the individual scores on the AS-scale (independent 
samples t-test: t(17)=-1.00, p>.30). No differences of the individual AS-scale scores were observed 
when comparing both experiments either (independent samples t-test; t(35)=-0.43, p>.60). Only the 
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five social and the seven antisocial subjects were considered for data analysis. The T-values of these 
two groups differed significantly (independent samples t-test: t(10)=-11.47, p<.001).  
Parts of these data have been submitted for publication with focus on reward prediction error signals. 
 
3.1.2. Task 
In contrast to experiment 1, subjects were presented with numerical feedback stimuli. After completing 
48 training trials, participants started with the first experimental block of 150 trials. As in experiment 1, 
they had to search for button press response patterns different to those in the training session during 
each block (see Table 1). A correct choice was indicated by the central presentation of the number 15 
in green colour (2 x 1.5 cm in size), announcing a gain of 15 Eurocents. An incorrect choice was 
indicated by the number 15 in red colour, announcing a loss of 15 Eurocents. If subjects had missed the 
response interval they were informed about it and also lost 15 Eurocents; the respective trials were 
discarded from further analysis. After a block of 150 trials, subjects were provided with overall 
performance feedback about how much money they had won. Afterwards, they were instructed to 
search for a new button press response pattern in the next block. After three blocks, a five minute break 
took place, where subjects were paid with the amount of money they had already gained to maintain 
their motivation. The experiment ended after six blocks. Afterwards, subjects were asked to estimate 
the subjectively perceived reward frequencies of the three cues in a brief questionnaire. Finally, they 
were rewarded with the remaining money won in the last three blocks. Including a seed capital of five 
Euros, participants gained on average 19.69 +/- 3.57 Euros. Subjects were debriefed about the external 
feedback manipulation afterwards.  
 
3.1.3. Data Acquisition and Preprocessing  
The same data acquisition procedure was applied as described in experiment 1. To accommodate the 
different trial numbers, the same procedure was applied as in experiment 1. Finally, each condition 
contained 61.61 +/- 8.4 trials on average per person.  
 
3.1.4. Data Analysis 
Subject- and condition-wise averages were calculated for the four conditions (1) expected positive 
 74 
feedback (exp-pos; cue ‘one’), (2) expected negative feedback (exp-neg; cue ‘three’), (3) unexpected 
positive feedback (unexp-pos; cue ‘three’), and (4) unexpected negative feedback (unexp-neg; cue 
‘one’). Subsequently, FRN and P300 peaks were extracted using the same criteria as in experiment 1. 
For FRN analysis, data were subjected to a mixed 2x3x2x2 ANOVA with the between-subject factor 
group (social, antisocial), and the within-subject factors location (Fz, FCz, Cz), expectation (expected, 
unexpected), and valence (positive, negative). For the P300 peak and latency analysis, only group, 
expectation, and valence were considered as factors.  
 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. Behavioral Results 
During the pre-experimental training session, subjects responded in 92.8% of cue ‘one’-trials with 
button one (100% reward probability), and in 79.9% of cue ‘two’-trials with button two (75%). In cue 
‘three’-trials subjects chose button one in 45.1% of all cases, and button two in 48.7%. For the 
remaining 6.3%, subjects were too slow to respond. Pair-wise McNemar tests showed significant 
differences in button press preferences. Button one was chosen significantly more often after cue ‘one’ 
than cue ‘three’ (χ
2
(1)
=81.74, p<.001). In the post-experimental questionnaire, subjects estimated the 
probability of occurrence of positive feedback after cue ‘one’ with a median of 70% [60;90], after cue 
‘two’ with a median of 70% [20;85], and after cue ‘three’ with a median of 20% [1;70]. A Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test revealed that positive feedback was expected significantly more often after cue ‘one’ 
than cue ‘three’ (Z =-3.83, p<.001). 
 
3.2.2. FRN 
Figure 2 displays feedback-locked average ERPs for expected and unexpected, positive and negative 
feedback conditions for the social and antisocial group. Main effects of expectation (F(1,10)=22.46, 
p<.01, ηp
2
=0.69) and valence (F(1,10)=19.08, p<.01, ηp
2
=0.66) indicated larger FRN amplitudes after 
unexpected and after negative feedback stimuli. Furthermore, the analysis revealed a two-way 
interaction of valence and group (F(1,10)=6.39, p<.05, ηp
2
=0.39). Visual inspection indicated larger 
FRN amplitudes in antisocial than social subjects for negative feedback, although the post-hoc analysis  
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Figure 2. Grand average ERPs of Experiment 2 
 
Grand averages at electrode sites FCz (upper panel) and Pz (lower panel) for negative (right column) and 
positive (left column) feedback conditions differentiating social and antisocial subjects for Experiment 2. 
Negative is drawn upwards per convention, feedback presentation started at 0 ms. 
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did not reach significance. 
 
3.2.3. P300 
A main effect of expectation (F(1,10)=27,71, p<.001, ηp
2
=0.74) indicated larger P300 amplitudes for 
unexpected than for expected stimuli. The two-way interaction with valence (F(1,10)=4.59, p=.058, 
ηp
2
=0.32) approached significance suggesting that unexpected positive feedback elicited the most 
positive P300 amplitudes. Antisocial and social subjects did not differ in their P300 amplitude (all 
p’s>0.2). Regarding P300 latency, a main effect of expectation F(1,10)=13.15, p<.01, ηp
2
=0.57) and an 
interaction of group and expectation F(1,10)=6.81, p<.05, ηp
2
=0.41) emerged. Only social subjects 
tended to show a shorter latency for expected compared to unexpected feedback (p=.07). 
 
3.3. Discussion 
As expected, motivationally salient feedback stimuli directly indicating monetary gain or loss led to 
larger FRN amplitudes after both negative and unexpected stimuli for all subjects. However, not 
supporting our hypothesis, antisocial subjects did not show diminished FRN amplitudes. In contrast, 
antisocials showed a tendency for enhanced FRN amplitudes after monetary loss. Larger P300 
amplitudes in all subjects after unexpected feedback supported the general P300 hypothesis; 
nevertheless, the proposed reduction in P300 amplitude for antisocials was not apparent.  
Again, the current results contradict the assumption that deficits in emotional reactivity in antisocials 
are reflected by diminished feedback processing ERPs. The feedback stimuli of the present paradigm 
represented monetary gain or loss. Thus, we assumed that they were interpreted as incentives and were 
therefore motivationally salient to subjects.  
In general, increased FRN amplitudes can be interpreted as error signals (Miltner et al., 1997) and 
response conflict signals (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), or as indicator for events 
worse than expected (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). This would imply that 
antisocial subjects experienced either more cognitive conflict after negative feedback, or that they 
experienced negative feedback in general as more unexpected than positive feedback. Further FRN 
interpretations emphasize subjective stimulus evaluation and motivational salience. Regarding the first, 
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increased FRN amplitudes would indicate negative evaluation of self-relevant information (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002). Regarding the latter, increased FRN amplitudes would indicate substantial 
mismatch between internal and external stimulus representations. Since such a mismatch indicates the 
need for behavioral modification, it instantly renders the stimulus at hand motivationally salient (Yeung 
et al., 2005). Additionally, reduced frustration tolerance might have led to an increase in FRN 
amplitude via representing the motivational significance of an unexpected or negative event. In favor of 
this hypothesis, the present results might indicate that antisocial subjects perceived negative feedback 
as more salient. Therefore, they evaluated negative feedback more negatively than social subjects, and 
experienced a greater mismatch between the external feedback stimuli and their internal beliefs. 
Furthermore, these increased FRN amplitudes for antisocial subjects could imply that antisocial 
subjects cared more than social subjects about loosing money. In general, it may be more important to 
antisocial than social subjects to maximize their monetary gain. Corroborating this interpretation, 
Cornell et al. (1996) reported that antisocial individuals show inconsiderate goal-directed behavior to 
obtain monetary incentives as well as an increase in social status. 
The missing group effect for the P300 peak amplitude results indicated that both groups allocated a 
comparable amount of processing capacity to the feedback stimuli. The P300 latency results point to its 
potential modification by antisocial personality traits. Whereas social subjects tended to show shorter 
P300 latencies and therefore, an accelerated processing speed for expected compared to unexpected 
stimuli, the P300 latencies of antisocial subjects did not differ for expected and unexpected feedback 
stimuli. This might indicate reduced speed of information processing and poorer attentional processing 
of expected target stimuli in antisocials (Gao & Raine, 2009). It has been suggested that the P3 only 
occurs after an event has been fully categorized or evaluated (Donchin & Coles 1988). According to 
this interpretation, the evaluation of expected compared to unexpected feedback stimuli took longer in 
antisocials than in social subjects. Therefore, it might be that antisocials need more time to categorize 
expected compared to unexpected stimuli. However, when the categorization process is finalized, the 
antisocials’ representation of the stimulus is updated to the same extent as in social subjects, as 
indicated by comparable P300 amplitude.  
To conclude, it may be possible that antisocials show high instead of low emotional reactivity to 
reinforcers. However, this may be specific to this particular kind of monetary incentives.  
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4. General Discussion 
The main result of the present study is that no emotional processing deficit (Cleckely, 1976; Blair et al., 
2004) was apparent during external feedback processing in antisocial subjects. On the contrary, 
antisocial subjects showed partly even enhanced feedback-related potentials. In experiment 2, the 
motivationally salient feedback stimuli differentiated antisocial from social subjects via the processing 
of negative stimuli. Antisocials showed a tendency towards enhanced FRN amplitudes after negative 
feedback. In contrast, valence did not differentiate between antisocial and social subjects in experiment 
1, because no group or interaction effects emerged. One explanation might be the fact that feedback 
stimuli were only indirectly indicating monetary incentives in experiment 1. Thus, it is possible that 
facial feedback stimuli, i. e., social cues, were less salient to antisocial subjects than the numerical 
stimuli because the former were not directly associated with monetary reinforcers. 
Furthermore, dissociation is apparent when comparing the present results to studies investigating 
internal error processing using error-related potentials in individuals with psychopathy and related 
constructs. Since the FRN can be described as the feedback-locked variant of the response-locked 
error-related negativity (ERN; Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Gehring, Goss, 
Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993), the present results should be comparable to these studies. The ERN is 
a negative ERP peaking around 50-100 ms after error commission (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et 
al., 1993). Hall, Bernat & Patrick (2007) reported reduced error-related amplitudes for subjects scoring 
high on the externalizing construct, which is thought to reflect an underlying vulnerability factor for 
conduct disorder, substance-use disorders, and antisocial behavior (Krueger, 1999; Krueger, McGue, & 
Iacono, 2001). The authors argued that lack of intrinsic motivation might be reflected in these reduced 
ERN amplitudes. In contrast, Munro et al. (2007a) and Brazil et al. (2009) reported no error processing 
differences between psychopaths and controls during reaction time tasks using neutral stimuli. 
Nevertheless, Munro et al. (2007a) found reduced error-related activation in psychopaths when using 
emotionally loaded stimuli in a reaction time task. Munro et al. (2007a) suggested therefore that 
psychopathy interacts with performance monitoring potentials (either response- or feedback-locked) 
more likely when affectively based stimuli (e. g., emotional faces) or affectively charged situations (e. 
g., reward or punishment) were involved. Munro’s assumption is partly transferable to the present data. 
Differences between antisocial and social subjects in experiment 2 could be explained due to the 
reward/punishment scenario. However, Munro et al. (2007b) would have predicted reduced feedback-
related amplitudes in antisocials during this affectively charged situation. To summarize, affectively 
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charged situations can either lead to a reduction of error-related amplitudes during internal error 
processing in individuals with psychopathy as reported by Munro et al. (2007a), or to an increase of 
error-related amplitudes during external error processing in antisocial individuals as reported by the 
present study. This may suggest dissociation between internal and external error processing in 
individuals with psychopathy or antisocial personality traits. In line with this assumption, von Borries 
et al. (2009) reported deficits in internal, but not in external error processing in individuals with 
psychopathy. Nevertheless, this dissociation might be explainable by differing motivational systems. 
Internal error processing might be driven by intrinsic motivation. Thus, the amplitude of the error-
related negativity decreases when intrinsic motivation decreases. In contrast, external error processing 
might be driven by extrinsic incentives (e. g., money). Thus, the amplitude of the FRN increases in the 
presence of valuable external incentives. Since monetary reinforcers affect antisocial or psychopathic 
individuals (Cornell et al., 1996), FRN amplitude enhancement after negative feedback in experiment 2 
might be explainable. 
The present P300 results were mixed and add to the ambiguous literature. Other studies found reduced 
P300 amplitudes in violent offenders (Bernat, Hall, Steffen, & Patrick, 2007), but also enhanced P300 
amplitudes in psychopaths (Raine & Venables, 1988), or even no difference at all in P300 amplitudes 
between the two groups (Jutai, Hare, & Connolly, 1987). In particular, the data at hand disagree with 
the assumption of Hicks et al. (2007) of reduced P300 amplitudes in antisocials. The authors reported 
P300 reduction in relation to the concept of externalizing. Hicks et al. (2007) explained the P300 
reduction based on diminished vigilance behavior during task presentation and decreased pre-stimulus 
preparation. Either the present data contradict Hicks et al.’s assumption of attention deficits in 
antisocials, or the non-pathological characteristic of antisocial personality traits can not be pulled 
together with the concept of externalizing.  Disregarding the literature on P300 and psychopathy, the 
present data support the view that heightened P300 amplitudes indicate less expected events (Duncan-
Johnson & Donchin, 1977), and incorporate high motivational significance (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004b) 
in all subjects.  
One has to keep in mind that most studies regarding psychopathy investigated male inmate subject 
samples whereas the present study investigated a healthy student sample comprising at least to one half 
of women. Although no gender differences were apparent in participants’ scorings on the AS-scale, 
future investigations should consider sex as factor, since men are at a significant higher risk than 
women to develop an antisocial personality disorder (Grant et al., 2004). Furthermore, inmate 
populations were often not differentiated in violent offenders with high aggression scores, or 
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individuals with psychopathy, or antisocial personality traits. Antisocial personality traits were often 
found within psychopaths, but are not exclusively incorporated. Only about 30% of individuals with 
antisocial personality disorder meet the criteria of psychopathy (Hart & Hare, 1996). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, it might be possible that antisocial and social subjects vary in their processing of 
expectancy, since differences in the P300 component emerged in both experiments between the two 
groups. Nevertheless, the present data suggest that emotional reactivity is intact or even enhanced in 
antisocial subjects. Apparently, antisocials experience external feedback as motivationally salient when 
presented with unexpected emotional expressions or monetary reinforcers. 
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8. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
Both studies aimed to provide further insight into the process of decision making and feedback 
utilization.  
 
The first article provided further support for the notion of Gehring and Willoughby (2002) viewing the 
FRN component as an indicator of the evaluation of the motivational impact of feedback outcomes. 
Furthermore, we propose that the FRN is a neuronal signal, which incorporates several distinct 
feedback attributes such as feedback expectancy or feedback valence. Thus, the FRN could be 
interpreted as a reinforcement learning signal indicating a mismatch between internal and external 
feedback representations. Most likely, this mismatch is detected by the ACC to extract positive and 
negative motivationally salient outcomes. Future research should aim to develop a theoretical model 
behind this suggestion of the FRN indexing mismatch between internal and external representations. 
Botvinick and colleagues (2001) have provided a valuable starting point for this challenge with their 
conflict monitoring account of the FRN. However, a noteworthy suggestion might be to try to integrate 
the conflict monitoring account of the FRN (Botvinick et al., 2001) with the RL-theory (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002) to achieve more valuable and reliable model predictions regarding the behaviour of the 
FRN amplitude. 
 
The refinement of the experimental paradigm used would be another valuable contribution in future 
research. The topic of participants’ instruction regarding the search for meta-rules has been raised by 
several anonymous reviewers. Although the FRN results were comparable during the two halves of the 
experiment, it would be interesting to omit this specific instruction regarding meta-rules and let 
participants find their own explanations for expected and unexpected feedback presentations. This 
research question is currently addressed in an on-going diploma thesis. Furthermore, reward 
probabilities of 50% (i.e., no predictions can be learned) were not included in the present project. These 
reward contingencies would be comparable to feedback presentation in Miltner’s time estimation task 
(Miltner et al., 1997), since his participants were also not able to predict feedback valence. 
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The second article, on the other hand, has more heuristic value compared to the first manuscript. 
Although the general results supported the aforementioned suggestion of the FRN indicating 
representational mismatch, the results regarding personality characteristics are somewhat ambiguous. 
In opposition to the a priori hypothesis, no deficits in emotional processing indexed via feedback 
processing were apparent in antisocial subjects. Furthermore, no P300 amplitude reduction in antisocial 
was observed either.  
 
Since the second manuscript is not published yet, it is certainly going to be revised in several ways. A 
major concern of this manuscript is the rather small sample size for each experiment. Although effect 
sizes are satisfactory, it might be possible that the observed effects of antisocial personality 
characteristics on FRN and P300 amplitudes are biased by the small sample size. Therefore, a future 
revision of this manuscript will include an increase in participants to strengthen the presented results. 
There is another aspect which is going to be taken care of in future manuscript revisions. The present 
manuscript focussed on the association between antisocial personality characteristics and the concept of 
psychopathy. The research question and hence deducted research hypotheses were embedded in the 
theoretical framework of psychopathy. However, participants of the present project were all healthy, 
young, and high-functioning college students – in comparison to older inmate or psychiatric 
participants of most of the cited studies. Furthermore, antisocial personality characteristics are reported 
to be associated with Factor 2 of psychopathy rather than with Factor 1 (Fowles & Dindo, 2006).  In 
line with this theoretical dual-deficit account of psychopathy by Fowles and Dindo (2006) is the notion 
that primary psychopaths were  unmotivated to modulate maladaptive behavior due to emotional 
processing deficits (Blair et al., 2005)- Secondary psychopaths were  unable to modulate maladaptive 
behavior due to their impulsiveness and reduced capability of exerting cognitive control (Morgan & 
Lilienfeld, 2000). In regard to the cognitive deficits of individuals scoring high on Factor 2 of 
psychopathy, Wilkowski and colleagues (2008) observed an error adjustment deficit in secondary 
psychopaths. These subjects showed a reduction in their tendency to slow down their behavioral 
performance after an erroneous trial in different reaction time tasks. Thus, Wilkowski and co-workers 
(2008) suggested that secondary psychopaths were prone to errors to a greater extent than primary 
psychopaths. The authors related this deficit to deficient ACC functions. Since error processing and 
error monitoring are associated with ACC functions (Botvinick et al., 2001), deficits in feedback 
processing might nevertheless be observable in antisocial individuals. In light of these findings, the 
theoretical framework of the second manuscript is going to be revised and will incorporate this 
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distinction between the two factor models of psychopathy.  
  
To further the understanding of the association between antisocial personality characteristics and the 
two-factor model of psychopathy, future studies should apply psychological measures to assess both 
constructs.. Regarding stimulus conceptualisation, it would be interesting to further investigate the 
processing of motivationally salient and neutral stimuli indicating gain or loss. However, the physical 
appearance of feedback stimuli should be considered as a possible disruption factor and should be 
operationalized carefully (e. g., picture complexity, colour, luminance, emotional content, etc.).  
The interpretation of the present P300 results should also be expanded. Larger P300 amplitudes for 
emotional feedback stimuli in antisocial subjects might indicate that antisocial participants had to 
recruit more cognitive resources to evaluate the unexpected and affective feedback stimuli compared to 
social ones. Thus, the task might have been more difficult for antisocial compared to social 
participants. This assumption could be related to behavioral data such as button choice behavior. 
Furthermore, antisocials might have been more motivated by the potential win-situation than social 
subjects. This would imply that unexpected feedback stimuli might have recruited more processing 
resources. Future investigations should take this assumption into account and collect additional data 
regarding the subjective rating of motivational impact of the feedback stimuli used. 
  
Another interesting research question concerns the relationship between antisocial personality 
characteristics, psychopathy, feedback processing, and empathy. Hare's (2003) definition of 
psychopathy already includes the term 'lack of empathy'. Decety and Moriguchi (2007) also describe 
empathy deficits in individuals with antisocial personality disorder. Blair and colleagues (1995) 
suggested these by observing reduced ability to feel other people's emotional states in antisocials. 
Recently, Ali and colleagues (2009) reported differing deficits in empathy processing in primary and 
secondary psychopaths. Applying an emotion recognition task with happy, sad, and neutral stimuli, the 
authors observed that individuals scoring high on primary psychopathy were not processing sad facial 
expressions properly. Individuals scoring high on secondary psychopathy showed inappropriate 
responses to neutral facial expressions. Primary psychopaths were experiencing sad expressions as 
neutral ones; secondary psychopaths were experiencing neutral expressions as negative ones. These 
findings raise the question whether or not individuals scoring high in either of the two psychopathy 
factors experience negative and positive feedback in different ways. 
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9. Abstract 
 
The processing of external feedback cues is crucial for decision making processes. Recent 
neuroscientific research has mainly focused on the processing of negative feedback events. The present 
project investigated neuronal processes related to positive feedback cues and personality 
characteristics. Two components of the event-related potential (ERP), the Feedback-Related Negativity 
(FRN) and the P300 were investigated in the context of positive and negative expected and unexpected 
feedback outcomes. Two EEG-studies were conducted applying a gambling paradigm where feedback 
stimuli consisted either of numbers indicating direct monetary gain and loss or of happy and angry 
faces indicating indirect monetary gain and loss. 
Two research questions were addressed in separate scientific manuscripts. The first manuscript 
addressed the questions whether unexpected positive feedback elicits a negative ERP deflection in the 
latency range of the FRN component. Feedback expectancy and feedback valence were manipulated in 
the experimental paradigm. Results indicate that expectancy as well as valence had comparable impact 
on FRN amplitude modulation. FRN amplitudes were larger after unexpected compared to expected, 
and after negative compared to positive feedback. P300 amplitudes were modulated by expectancy – 
unexpected feedback conditions yielding largest P300 amplitudes – but not by valence. Thus, the 
proposal is made to interpret FRN amplitude modulation in terms of a reinforcement learning signal 
which is indicating motivationally salient outcomes. 
The second manuscript addressed the question whether antisocial personality characteristics influence 
FRN amplitude modulation related to feedback expectancy and feedback valence. The effect of 
numerical versus emotional feedback stimuli was investigated in individuals scoring low and high on a 
psychological measure of antisociality. Results indicate that it is the dimension of feedback expectancy 
and not of valence that differentiates social from more antisocial individuals. 
Future research on feedback processing should try to integrate the different theoretical frameworks and 
recent findings to promote the understanding of the underlying cognitive processes. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Verarbeitung externer Feedbackreize ist essentiell für das Treffen von Entscheidungen. Die 
aktuelle neurowissenschaftliche Forschung bezüglich Entscheidungsfindung befasste sich bis dato 
hauptsächlich mit negativem Feedback und seinen Konsequenzen.  Die vorliegende Dissertation 
beschäftigte sich mit neuronalen Prozessen in Zusammenhang mit positiven Feedbackreizen und 
Persönlichkeitseigenschaften. Zwei Komponenten des ereigniskorrelierten Potentials (EKP), die 
Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) und die P300 Komponente wurden im Kontext von positiven und 
negativen, sowie erwarteten und unerwarteten Feedbackreizen untersucht. Es wurden zwei 
Elektroenzephalogramm (EEG) Studien durchgeführt, in denen eine Spielaufgabe als 
Experimentalparadigma vorgegeben wurde. Die Feedbackreize bestanden aus Zahlen, die direkt einen 
Geldgewinn oder -verlust andeuteten, sowie aus fröhlichen und ärgerlichen Gesichtern, die indirekt 
einen Geldgewinn oder -verlust anzeigten. 
In getrennten Manuskripten wurde der Klärung zweier Forschungsfragen nachgegangen. Das erste 
Manuskript beschäftigte sich mit der Frage, ob unerwartetes positives Feedback eine vergleichbare 
negative Auslenkung des EKPs hervorruft wie es bei der FRN nach der Präsentation von negativem 
Feedback zu beobachten ist. Deshalb wurden die Feedbackdimensionen Erwartung und Valenz 
experimentell manipuliert. Die daraus resultierenden Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass sowohl 
Erwartung als auch Valenz einen vergleichbaren Einfluss auf die Amplitudenmodulation der FRN 
haben. Eben diese FRN Amplituden waren erhöht nach unerwartetem und negativem Feedback. P300 
Amplituden wurden hingegen nur durch die Erwartung des Reizes moduliert, nicht durch dessen 
Valenz. Daraus resultiert die wissenschaftliche Hypothese, die FRN Amplitudenmodulation als Signal 
des Verstärkungslernens  zu betrachten, welches saliente Ereignisse anzeigt. 
Das zweite Manuskript beschäftigt sich mit der Frage ob antisoziale Persönlichkeitseigenschaften die 
FRN Amplitudenmodulation in Bezug auf Feedbackerwartung und – valenz beeinflussen. Es wurde der 
Einfluss von numerischen im Gegensatz zu emotionalen Feedbackreizen in jenen Versuchspersonen 
untersucht, die entweder hohe oder niedrige Werte auf einer psychologischen Skala zur Erfassung von 
antisozialen Persönlichkeitseigenschaften aufwiesen. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass es die 
Dimension der Feedbackerwartung und nicht der -valenz ist, die zwischen sozialern und antisozialeren 
Individuen unterscheidet. 
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Zukünftige Forschung zu Feedbackverarbeitung sollte versuchen die theoretischen Ansätze mit 
aktuellen Forschungsergebnissen in Einklang zu bringen, um das Verständnis zugrunde liegender 
Prozesse von Entscheidungsfindung besser verstehen zu können. 
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11. Supplements 
Instruction Study Monetary Feedback 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem EEG-Experiment zum Thema Entscheidungsfindung. 
Ihre Aufgabe in den folgenden Trainingsdurchgängen ist folgende: Versuchen Sie herauszufinden, welche 
Symbole welchen Tasten der Responsebox zugeordnet sind. Es gibt drei Symbole, diese werden Ihnen nun kurz 
zum Kennenlernen vorgestellt. 
Presentation of the three visual cues: star, triangle, circle. 
Wie Sie gerade gesehen haben, handelt es sich um drei unterschiedliche Symbole, als Antworttasten stehen 
Ihnen aber nur die Tasten '1' und '2' zur Verfügung. 
Das Training sieht nun folgendermaßen aus: Sie werden für 500 ms eines der drei Symbole  
präsentiert bekommen, sobald anschließend ein Fragezeichen erscheint, drücken Sie bitte entweder Taste '1' oder 
'2'. Kurz danach erhalten sie eine Rückmeldung ob Sie richtig getippt haben oder nicht. Zwischen den 
Trainingsaufgaben erscheint jeweils ein kleines Fadenkreuz. Bei manchen Symbolen ist es möglicherweise  
einfacher eine in hohem Maße verlässliche Zuordnung zu finden als bei anderen! Bitte starten Sie das Training 
mit einer beliebigen Taste der Responsebox! 
Forty-eight training trials were presented. 
Jetzt startet das eigentliche Experiment! Sie werden wieder kurz jeweils eines der bekannten Symbole sehen, bei 
der Präsentation des Fragezeichens, welches maximal 2000 ms am Schirm zu sehen sein wird, antworten Sie 
bitte entweder mit Taste '1' oder '2' . Kurz danach erhalten Sie erneut Rückmeldung. Für jede richtige Antwort, 
angezeigt durch die Zahl 15 in grüner Farbe werden Ihnen 15 Cent gutgeschrieben, bei nicht passenden 
Antworten (15 in roter Farbe) werden Ihnen 15 Cent abgezogen. 
Im Experiment müssen Sie die Symbol-Tasten-Kombinationen des Trainings als Antwortgrundlage verwenden. 
Allerdings werden nun die von Ihnen geforderten Zuweisungen wesentlich schwieriger werden, da es ab jetzt 
zusätzlich hochkomplexe Tastendrucksequenzen zu entdecken und anzuwenden gilt! In jedem der sechs 
Durchgänge wird eine andere Tastendrucksequenz gesucht! Ihr Startkapital beträgt 2,50 €, es ist ein Gewinn bis 
zu 25€ möglich. Nach jeweils 150 Trials erhalten Sie zusätzlich Feedback, wie viel Geld Sie bereits erspielt 
haben und wie sich Ihr Gesamtguthaben entwickelt.  Hier können Sie jeweils eine kurze Pause einlegen. Sollten 
Sie  einmal auf den Tastendruck vergessen bzw. nicht innerhalb der geforderten 2000 ms mit einem Tastendruck 
antworten, so  läuft das  Programm automatisch weiter, es werden Ihnen jedoch jeweils 15 Cent abgezogen. 
Nach der Hälfte der Aufgaben ist eine längere Pause geplant. Hier erhalten Sie Ihren bis dahin erspielten 
Geldbetrag ausbezahlt, den Rest am Ende des Experiments! Es wird auf alle Fälle ein Gewinn von mindestens 10 
Euro sein! Viel Erfolg beim Experiment! Sie starten es mit einem beliebigen Tastendruck! 
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Instruction Study Facial Feedback 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem EEG-Experiment zum Thema Entscheidungsfindung. 
Ihre Aufgabe in den folgenden Trainingsdurchgängen ist folgende: Versuchen Sie herauszufinden, welche
 Symbole welchen Tasten der Responsebox zugeordnet sind. Es gibt drei Symbole, diese werden Ihnen 
nun kurz zum Kennenlernen vorgestellt… 
Presentation of the three visual cues: star, triangle, circle. 
Wie Sie gerade gesehen haben, handelt es sich um drei unterschiedliche Symbole, als Antworttasten 
stehen Ihnen aber nur die Tasten '1' und '2' zur Verfügung. Das Training sieht nun folgendermaßen aus: Sie 
werden für 500 ms eines der drei Symbole präsentiert bekommen, sobald anschließend ein  
Fragezeichen erscheint, drücken Sie bitte entweder Taste '1' oder '2'. Kurz danach erhalten sie eine  
Rückmeldung ob Sie richtig getippt haben oder nicht. Zwischen den Trainingsaufgaben erscheint jeweils ein 
kleines Fadenkreuz. Bei manchen Symbolen ist es möglicherweise einfacher eine in hohem Maße verlässliche 
Zuordnung zu finden als bei anderen! Bitte starten Sie das Training mit einer beliebigen Taste der Responsebox! 
Forty-eight training trials were presented. 
Jetzt startet das eigentliche Experiment! Sie werden wieder kurz jeweils eines der bekannten 
Symbole sehen, bei der Präsentation des Fragezeichens, welches maximal 2000 ms am Schirm zu  
sehen sein wird, antworten Sie bitte entweder mit Taste '1' oder '2' . Kurz danach erhalten Sie erneut  
Rückmeldung. Jede korrekte Antwort wird mit einem Gesicht mit einem positiven Gesichtsausdruck 
zurückgemeldet. Bei falschen Antworten werden Sie ein Gesicht mit einem negativen Gesichtsausdruck 
erkennen. Im Experiment müssen Sie die Symbol-Tasten-Kombinationen des Trainings als Antwortgrundlage 
verwenden. Allerdings werden nun die von Ihnen geforderten  
Zuweisungen wesentlich schwieriger werden, da es ab jetzt zusätzlich hochkomplexe Tastendruck- 
sequenzen zu entdecken und anzuwenden gilt! Diese beginnen immer mit einer der zuvor gelernten  
Zuweisungen! In jedem der sechs Durchgänge wird eine andere Tastendrucksequenz gesucht! Nach jeweils 150 
Trials erhalten Sie zusätzlich Feedback, wie viele Antworten Sie richtig hatten. 
Hier können Sie jeweils eine kurze Pause einlegen. Sollten Sie  einmal auf den Tastendruck vergessen bzw. nicht 
innerhalb der geforderten 2000 ms mit einem Tastendruck antworten, so  läuft das Programm ohne 
Konsequenzen automatisch weiter. Nach der Hälfte der Aufgaben ist eine längere Pause geplant. Am Ende des 
Experiments werden Sie eine leistungsbezogene finanzielle Entschädigung erhalten. 
Auf den nächsten Folien lernen Sie die verwendeten Feedbackstimuli kennen. 
Visual presentation of the two female and two male posers, depicting each a happy and an angry facial 
expression. 
Wenn Sie keine weiteren Fragen haben können Sie das Experiment mit einem Tastendruck starten. Viel 
Vergnügen! 
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Visual Cues 
 
Bates, E., Federmeier, K., Herron, D., Iver, G., Jacobsen, T., Pechmann, et al. (2000). Introducing the 
 CRL International Picture-Naming Project (CRL-JPNP). Center for Research in Language 
 Newsletter, 12, 1-14. 
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Facial Feedback Cues  
(Two female and two male posers were used as feedback stimuli, each depicting a happy and an angry 
facial expression. Exemplarily, each poser is presented once). 
 
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1976). Pictures of facial affect. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists 
 Press. 
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